



# **TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN INDIA**

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BY

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
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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**Terrorism as a Political Technique in India**" is the original work of **Mr. MD. Ashfaq Khan**, and that the candidate has fulfilled all the prescribed requirements of the attendance. I certify that this dissertation is fit to be submitted for M.Phil degree in Centre for Strategic Studies.

  
(Prof. Saleem Akhtar)  
*Supervisor*

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

Explaining, terrorism is a very problematic issue, defying general agreement about its meaning. The subject of terrorism is very emotive which necessarily reflects itself on the analytical horizons of conceptualization of terrorism. Although it still remains a controversial subject but the greater convergence of academic and scholarly views is on its increasing recognition, that it is a technique of applying violence; a way of carrying out violence to the adversary, who may be politically, economically and above all militarily stronger than the practitioners of terrorism. It is a kind of unconventional warfare, in which violence necessarily possesses the elements of terror, thereby achieving the political objectives.

This study "Terrorism as a political technique in India", also looks upon the subject as a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is violence which is consciously carried out for political purposes. It is a political technique for achieving political ends. As the subject of this study indicates, the focus is on India. Attempts have been made to analyse the phenomenon of terrorism as a political technique, in the pre and the post independent India. In the overall perspective it looks on terrorism as a political technique.

## II

The First Chapter definition, concept and nature of terrorism of this study deals with the subject of terrorism. It endcavours to analyse the conceptual problems associated with the concept, its nature and characteristics.

The Second Chapter pre-Independence history of terrorism in India, attempt to look at the use of terrorism as a political technique in pre-independence time mainly covering the freedom struggle.

The Third Chapter terrorism in post independent India analyses the employment of terrorism as a means for political ends in post independent India, basically focusing on the terrorism of Punjab, Kashmir and the North Eastern region of the country.

The Study is based on the published sources, depending mainly on the secondary sources. No originality in the interpretations of given facts is being claimed, the purpose basically is to understand the employment of terrorism as a means to an end, specifically in India.

It is a humble attempt to understand the problem, not being presumptions of offering any solutions which are prerogative of the political, though not necessarily wiser, minds.



# **Chapter - 1**

## **Terrorism : A Conceptual Analysis**

Terrorism is a very problematic phenomenon defying general agreement among scholars and its analysts. Although, the scholars have extensively written on the subject, but it continues to be the subject matter of debate and discussion. The vagueness with which the term terrorism is used is the major source which proves problematic when it comes to academic analysis. It is so loosely used to describe the variety of acts of violence that it has become pejorative these days. Some governments are prone to label as terrorism, all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while anti government extremists frequently claim to be the victims government terror. What is called terrorism, thus seems to depend on point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgement and if one party attaches the label terrorists to its opponent, then it indirectly persuades others to adopt the moral view point. This is the primary controversy which prevails upon the academic discussion and scholarly. A person studying the phenomenon of terrorism inadvertently injects his own value judgement in to the analysis<sup>1</sup>. Therefore its conceptualization in a value free language is next to impossible. However it is pertinent here to analyse the concept of terrorism to understand its meaning and nature.

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1. Brian M. Jenkins. "International Terrorism : A New Mode of Conflict", in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (ed.) International Terrorism and World Security. Croom Helm, London, 1975. Also See IDR Research Team. "Punjab : Profile of a Terrorist Movement", Indian Defence Review, Vol. II, No. 2, January 1987, p. 121.

The concept of terrorism is associated with the origin of modern democracy. The word, originally French, became part of the English political language (1785) after the Reign of terror. It meant a system of terror and referred to the activities of a government "government by intimidation, a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted"<sup>2</sup>. After words the word took on new meanings. By the 1890's, a terrorist was a rebel, who attempted to destroy a system by assassinating its major office holders. Dominant concerns of a particular period, determines the subsequent usage. After the rise of the totalitarian regimes in the 1930's terrorism was most often referred to the practice of those states, but by the 1950's it became identified almost exclusively with rebel's again. The meaning of the term 'Terrorism' has depended on the dominant concerns of the particular periods.

Terrorism is a kind of violence undertaken to influence the political behaviour. The encyclopaedia of Social Sciences defines terrorism as "a term used to describe the method or theory whereby an organised group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence"<sup>3</sup>. It is also seen as use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for

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2. David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism", in Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics, Vol. 2, Marry Hawkesiworth (ed.) Routledge, London, 1992.

3. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 13 - 14, 1968, pp. 575-579.

political purpose<sup>4</sup>. Most dictionary definitions of the term terrorism commonly means the rule by terror. In the twentieth century terrorism, before the end of the Second World War, was overwhelmingly practiced by the State apparatus and in the post war period by the groups opposed to the state. Terrorism depends upon the definition of the world which the author accepts. Over 90 percent of the books and writings on the subject assume that terrorism is organised violence against the state, ofcourse with political objectives<sup>5</sup>.

The major complexity still remains with the definition of terrorism. In recent years however, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged with regard to the definition of terrorism. There is general recognition that terrorism is a specific method of struggle<sup>6</sup>. It can and has been employed by an infinite variety of actors in international system, including governments, political factions, criminal gangs and even religious movements and cults. According to this emerging agreement on the meaning of terrorism, it becomes a means to an end, not an end in itself. In other words, terrorism has objectives.

Terrorism being a means to an end is a kind of warfare. War, literally means a state of conflict, a

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4. American College Dictionary, 1966.

5. N.S. Saksena. "Preface", Terrorism History and Facts in the World and in India, Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1985, p. 11.

6. Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism : A Guide to Concepts, Theories Data Bases, and Literature. North Holland. Publication Company, Amsterdam, 1983, pp. 5-159.

contest between parties carried on by arms, any long continued struggle, open hostility. Thus wars as are understood, were fought with knowledge and understanding of the parties involved. Terrorism is interestingly consistent with the essence of classical military strategy, the efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy<sup>7</sup>. Yay Mallin also describes "terrorism as an armed conflict which uses violence, causes both material and economic damages, it is therefore a kind of armed conflict/war"<sup>8</sup>. The systematic terrorism of Middle East represents a new dimension of warfare. The Black September Massacre of the Israeli Athlets was fundamentally a military measure because having failed in four conventional warfare to defeat the enemy, the Palestinians resorted to unconventional warfare specially terrorism. For them terrorism has become an integrated part of strategy in which there are well defined political, economic and military objectives<sup>9</sup>. Moreover the adherents or Practitioners of terrorism prefer terming their act as war operations against the enemy and consequently if captured, they say they should be treated as prisoners of war rather than as convicted criminals. Although states

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7. Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism : Trend and Potentialities, Rand Corp, California 1977, p. 38, also See, K. Subrahmanyam, "Terrorism : to the Forefront of the Stage, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 3, June 1986, p. 240.
  8. Yay Mallin, "Terrorism as a Military Weapon, in Mariusk. Living Ston, and others (ed.) International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Green Wood Press, London, 1978, p. 391.
  9. Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Air Ports Terrorist Act, October, 1983, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983, pp. 116-117.

would never accede to this theory of terrorism. They (terrorists) remain convinced that they are fighting a war. A terrorist sees himself/herself as a soldier, even though he may wear no uniform nor necessarily receive any formal military training <sup>10</sup>. Terrorism thus is the threat of violence or series of acts of violence effected through surreptitious means by an individual, an organisation or a people to further his or their political objectives. This is therefore a military activity. In this perspective terrorism is seen as a weapon of militarily weak short of confronting the superior enemy in open combat. This is the military weapon through which militarily weak wages war against the superior and well organised enemy. It is essential to specify here that the nature of every unconventional warfares (low intensity warfare) like guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and revolutionary warfare is protracted. So any isolated terrorist incident do not qualify to be termed as terrorism. To make it a warfare, the threat of occurrence of terrorist incidents in future is necessary and essential. Terrorism therefore in a generic way could be described as that diversity of actions, and measures, through which militarily weak carry out violence against the strong adversary. It recourses to all possible means, tricks stratagemms and tactics. It is a kind of warfare which possesses within itself high degree of flexibility and creativity.

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10. Eric Morris, Terrorism : Threat and Response, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. 26.

## **NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM :**

The emotive nature of the subject matter, the terms derogatory thrust and the political discourse are major contributory factors to the complexity of the concept of terrorism. It is largely being recognised and considered as a technique of applying violence, which in principle can be used by any one in all sorts of conflict situations. Violence is a generic term which means carrying out the damage to the enemy not necessarily having the elements of terror. Terrorism is a kind of violence with essential elements of terror. This kind of violence is based on the philosophy of terror. The philosophy which is very old having its roots in the philosophy of a Chinese thinker and the great military strategist Sun Tzu who philosophised that "kill one and frighten ten thousand". The strategic aim is to kill one to generate terror in the Psyche of thousands of people. Through this strategy the practitioners try to influence the political behaviour of those in authority for political purposes. Although terror is an inherent element of terrorism. But here the question arises what is the difference between terrorism and other kind of violence while all violence instill some kind of terror/fear in the minds of the people/target. In case of terrorism the acts are generally directed against the government or the state which is politically, economically and militarily superior and stronger than the terrorists. Terrorism affects the general functioning of the society impairing the moral of

the people, eroding the support base of the government demonstrating its weakness, with a view to draw the attention of the public and the government alike, towards the political objectives, causes and grievances. The aim is to defame and discredit the established order and create chaos and confusion in the administrative machinery and instill fear in the minds of the general public. Where as in cases of violence practiced by mafia king, underworld, the dacoits or other kinds of violence, it is not intended by the practitioners to create the atmosphere of terror, then to obtain their objectives. In terrorism, it is not directed against the victims but against those who act as road blocks to the cause of terrorism. Putting it mathematically means killing A to influence the behaviour of B as per the objectives of the terrorists. But in other cases killing A does not necessarily mean to influence the behaviour of B. In other kinds of violence generally A remains the element of terror is significant in terrorism. It is for this reason that a terrorists generally undertakes those actions, which create the general climate of fear, designed to influence the thinking of other human beings according to the desire of the practitioners of terrorism. If there is a choice between derailment of a goods train and a passenger train, a terrorist will prefer the derailment of the passenger train as he will be able to infuse terror into the minds of the people<sup>11</sup>. So violence

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11. D.P. Sharma, Countering Terrorism, Lancer Books, New Delhi, 1992, p.11.



that can create psychological and emotional effect on the masses fall under the purview of terrorism. In any other warfare, violence is the beginning and its consequences are the end of it. For terrorist, the consequences of the violence are themselves merely a step towards the achievement of the objectives.

The objectives of military operations terrorism are not exactly those of conventional combat; causing of maximum damage to the enemy but they are more or less same in the sense that they also aim at weakening the will of the enemy, surrendering to the cause of the terrorist. The combating procedures and methods are no doubt, different. Terrorists do not try to take and hold ground or physically destroy their opponents forces<sup>12</sup>. They usually lack that kind of power or having it are constrained from applying it. The enemy's rear is the battleground for terrorism. Moreover, it has both national and international battlefields. It even some times takes place in the countries which have no direct or indirect relations either with the terrorists or with the enemy against whom the terrorist are carrying out violence.

Terrorism like any other form of low intensity warfare believes in the philosophy of to stay alive today to fight tomorrow. This necessarily provides justification for

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12. Brian M. Jenkins. Op.Cit., p. 15.

proroguing the conflict. Moreover, this is substantiated from the factual believe that the proroguing of the conflict proves castly : politically, militarily and economically for the adversary and the beneficial for the terrorist who long for public support and establishment of their cause and credentials.

Although terrorism also depends on public support but its initiation not necessarily requires public support. As a matter of fact in majority of terrorist struggles it is seen that terrorism is supported by external forces: like the terrorism that was in Punjab, terrorism of Kashmir and North East. One thing is to be highlighted here is that cause of terrorism for which arms are taken up was present their in majority of the cases. This cause was exploited by the external forces. But in some cases, even the cause was created. The point to be made is that terrorism in order to continue compulsorily requires both internal and external support. Without support its sustenance is not possible. For this terrorist deliberately invite the atrocities and repression to be committed against the people supporting the terrorists as this will increase the public support as well as the rate of recruitment. The atrocities and repression committed by adversary is directly linked with the increase in public support as well as rate of recruitment. The strategy is that some how manage the fulfilment of political objectives by using whatever means available to

terrorists<sup>13</sup>.

In the military parlance, terrorism like other unconventional warfare implicitly denies recognition of established rules and conventions of warfare. It refuses to distinguish between combatants and non combatants and recognises no humanitarian constraints. It includes acts of violence or campaigns of violence waged outside the accepted rules and procedure of international diplomacy and war. It is unconventional, unorthodox and fought by irregulars. It is characterised by the absence of pitched battles. It is looked upon as a warfare without territory, waged without armies as we know them. It is like other unconventional warfare, way of conducting hostilities in certain circumstances by refusing to be committed to large scale engagement. Often it is a delaying strategy awaiting propitious political and militancy circumstances. All forms of violence whether guerrilla, insurgency terrorism have one basic common trait namely they are confrontational, on small or large scale and seen as such by both sides. Each side recognises the other as its enemy and declares this openly. Although unconventional warfare it is believed that violence is practiced between uniformed and recognisable combatants, but does not involve the civilians. The last war to conform to these conventions was that of 1914. Since then, the new techniques of war have come up so the

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13. See Iqbalur Rehman, National Security and the Problem of Unconventional Warfare, Kanishka Publishing House, Delhi, 1992.

adherence to those conventions is not possible. Moreover, the warfare has evolved itself towards the multiplicity of means and complexity of methods. It is no more considered as an independent military activity. It is fought these days simultaneously at various fronts : political, economic, military, diplomatic and psychological. So the belief that conventional warfare follows the international rules and principles seems true superficially. Terrorism in this perspective could be seen something not unconventional but conventional for those who chose to carryout violence to their adversary through the means of terror.

Terrorism although is an independent form of unconventional warfare, away from and outside the purview of guerrilla warfare, revolutionary Warfare insurgency and conventional warfare, but terrorist means and methods are also frequently employed by guerrilla forces, insurgents and revolutionaries. The use of terror violence is interwoven with a wider repertoire of unconventional warfare. In central America for example terrorism is typically used inconjunction with rural guerrilla and economic and political warfare in all out bids to topple government<sup>14</sup>. Terrorism is also used in conjunction with other forms of unconventional warfare due to the reason in some situations it became difficult to identify that the conflict is the

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14. Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart, Contemporary Research on Terrorism, Aberdeen University Press, 1989, p. 11.

case of pure terrorism or guerrilla warfare, insurgency or revolutionary warfare. However, there is a clear demarcating line between these forms of warfare at theoretical level but at practical level. Sometimes they seem interwoven together blurring the difference. All these forms of unconventional warfare are dependent to a great extent for their success and survival, upon the support of the populace. The degree of support of the population in revolutionary warfare is higher than in other forms of warfare, as revolutionary warfare aims at changing the whole system and the society. In case of terrorism the degree of population support is not as high as in cases of other forms of warfare. Terrorism may survive even if the majority is not supporting it.

Insurgency and guerrilla warfare both adopt the same strategy and tactics to wage war against the conventional enemy but insurgents obtain an area or territory from where they operate their war activities whereas guerrilla are not necessarily attached to the territory. However, guerrilla warfare in its eventual development tries to establish and control a territorial area. Guerrilla are illusive and the terrorists are even more, so both are more illusive than insurgents. The difference between insurgency and terrorism is that the latter tries to evolve into former. The trouble in Kashmir is not simply the case of terrorism. It is rather the insurgency in incipient stage. Despite the demarcation which exists at theoretical level, the accompanying of

terrorisms with other forms of warfare make this demarcation blurred thereby generating confusion about the proper classification of unconventional warfare.

The causes of terrorism are manifold. Various writers have written in details about the causes of warfare. To some of them war has its roots in the nature of human beings and to some other in the nature of society. According to one group human beings possess innate aggressive tendencies, the expression of which results in the form of warfare. The other group on the other hand holds that aggressiveness in human beings is not innate but that is learned. Human beings, according to them by their nature are neither aggressive nor submissive, neither war like nor peaceful, they develop themselves in either direction depending on what they learn by interacting with their environment and culture, they do not act and react mechanically according to their instinct, but according to the views and emotions they learn through experience. It could be therefore said that terrorism is not manifestation of human nature but making a specific response to specific situations - Social, Political or Economic.<sup>15</sup>

Every man possesses his own interest and coming together means the collision of interests. To satisfy their interests, men organised themselves into groups and then

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15. For Details see, Collin's Encyclopaedia, Vol. 23, Macmillan, Education Company, New York, 1987, pp. 230-235.

their group interests are in conflict. When this happens they try to satisfy and resolves their conflicting interests through peaceful means and failing this what ensues is war. All this implies that war is a means for achieving and obtaining a desired objective and it does not occur without a reason/cause.

However, the reason may not be single or common. Reason/causes are diverse, often one cause overlaps another or several causes. It is therefore not possible to identify its real or universal cause. However, it has often occurred in nations in which social grievances were manifested by a desire for political and social changes. It has no single specific cause. It has flourished in different countries at different times as a result of combination of different factors.

Terrorism has been generally recognised as a special methods of struggle for political purposes. In this struggle there are five major participants in the process of terror(a) practitioners of violence (terrorism) (b) The immediate victims (c) Wider target group or the society which the terrorists seek to intimidate (d) The neutral bystanders within the society experiencing the terrorism and (e) The public opinion, national or international including media. It also includes some of the basic characteristics : a) Violence, b) Political Purpose, c) Objective to instill fear, to terrorise d) Continuity of threat with unpredictability of how, when and where the

terror, will be committed. Terrorism with these characteristics is a form of warfare for political purposes. It is an instrument to weaken the adversary to surrender to the demands of practitioners of terrorism. Terrorists by using different tactics carry out violence to the adversary for political purposes.

#### **TACTICS AND METHODOLOGY OF TERRORISM :**

The variety of methods are adopted by terrorists. These include assassination, expropriation, kidnapping, destruction, hijacking etc. The list is far from exhaustion. Rape assault, arson, etc. are very much the tools of terrorists. Since terrorists operate in small numbers, they do not go in for large targets. Operations are conducted in a spectacular fashion as possible by concentrated, coordinated and synchronized waves of simultaneous actions. Statistically, of the over 7000 terrorist incidents between 1968 and 1983, 2504 entailed the use of explosives including bombing, 189 involved the use of hijacking of aeroplanes or other means of transportation, 421 were kidnapping, 498 were assassinations, 168 involved barricade of hostages and 293 constituted other armed attacks.

#### **ASSASSINATION :**

Assassination in simple terms can be defined as murder by interested parties for the reward. It is carried



out by surprise or secretly. The word has been derived from Arabic word "Hash Ashin". Hashish-caters. A military and religious sect in Syria in the 11th century which became notorious for its secret murder in obedience to the will of its chief. fortified themselves for their adventure by tackling Hashish an intoxicating drug and drink made from Hemp. They always operated in complete secrecy, some times disguised as strangers and Christians, and always used a dagger, never poison or a missile assassination has been justified or even urged, as a revolutionary means by a number of authority. It is the oldest method and has been the most frequently adopted by terrorists<sup>16</sup>.

Murder or killing dramatises the demands of terrorists. The list of important victims is far from exhaustive but the assassinations which made some impact on masses. Pleasant or unpleasant are very few in number. Although the assassination as a means was employed by the Punjabi terrorist to murder the Prime Minister of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by the LTTE at Tamil Militant Organisation of Sri Lanka. This organisation is also responsible for many such acts committed in Sri Lanka. Assassination is most efficacious tactics of the terrorist. It is generally employed to eliminate those high in authority as their

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16. D.P. Sharma, Op.Cit., PP 21-22, also see Eric Morris, Op.Cit., pp. 74-75.

elimination results in to the national crises providing boost to the terrorist cause and their moral<sup>17</sup>.

#### **KIDNAPPING :**

The second most frequent method of terrorist operation has been kidnapping. It has made use of from times immemorial for political purposes and for exportion of ransom. It however, increased greatly in the late 1960's. The Tupamaros in Uruquary are considered the poineers in the technique of kidnapping of important members of the diplomatic corps and holding them hostage. The outstanding cases of abduction were the US Ambassador to Guatemala and Brazil. the West German Ambassador to Guatemala. President of Argentina (1970), the Swiss Ambassador to Brazil, the British Ambassador to Uruguay (1971) and the OPEC executive in vienna (1975).

After 1973 the rate of kidnapping decreased. The year 1974, however, saw the kidnapping of patricia Hearst in San Francisco and the attempted kidnapping of Princess Anne in London. The Syymbionese Liberation Army (SLA).USA, Kidnapped patricia Hearst, the daughter of a rich businessman for ransom. They tried to obtain wide publicity by demanding food far the poor instead of the usuall ransom. Kidnapping gained momentum again during 1976-78. In Italy kidnapping far ransom became one of the biggest businesses of the Republic of Italy<sup>18</sup>.

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17. Eric Morris. Op.Cit., pp. 74-75.

18. Ibid. pp. 22-23.

4th February 1984, an Indian diplomat, R.H. Mahatre, was kidnapped near Birmingham (England) by KLA (Kashmir Liberation Army) terrorist and subsequently murdered.

The kidnapping is not necessarily undertaken for ransom but also some times to bargain the release of other captured terrorists. The daughter of the Home Minister of India, was kidnapped by the Kashmiri militants, few years back to seek the release of prisoner militants. Their demand was met and few militants were released.

#### **HOSTAGE BARRICADE :**

Traditionally in Kidnapping the hostage is taken to a hideout and kept during the ransom negotiation. The kidnappers communicate by note or telephone, at their own initiative, and they make break off communication at will. They can be talked to only during phone calls, otherwise they may be reached indirectly, by radio broadcasts or press publication. In the hostage barricade situation, the kidnappers seize one or more hostages but make no attempt to reach a hideout. In fact, they are also hostages they usually barricade themselves in a building and immediately warn that army attempt to kill or capture them will be disastrous for the hostages. The terrorists, then include their own escape as a part of any subsequently bargain. Hostage Barricade is a very daring tactic of the terrorist because terrorists themselves make hostages by taking hostages. What happens in these cases is what the area

where the hostages are held in surrounded by military or the commando force. But in such situations the counter terrorist force of a country is efficient enough the result is the failure of the terrorist action. In the hostages taking incidents generally the demands is the release the prisoner not the extortion or ransom. However, this tactics is more effective in publicizing the terrorists cause.

#### **HIJACKING :**

Hijacking is a another method of terrorist. Hijacking means basically the capturing the aeroplanes in the take of situations. This method gained currency and credibility during the 1970's. when the militant organisation of Plestine Liberation Organisation carried out a number of hijackings. Later on with the improvements in the security arrangements at the airports reduced the hijacking incidents to almost negligible level. Terrorist to meet out the situation, so developed started hijacking trains, buses and other things hijacking incidents in India, although not many but have been carried out by the terrorist. Hijacking still is a method available to the terroris. Hijacking incident is an attention getting event which finds media coverage there by propogating the cause of terrorism<sup>19</sup>.

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19. S.K. Ghosh, Aircraft Hijacking. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi. 1985. pp. 1-2.

## EXPROPRIATION :

Expropriation is another tool in the hands of terrorists. Bank robberies and robberies of trains and Vans carrying large sums of money have been carried out in Russia, India and many other countries from 1960, onwards. It is considered the easiest operation in which new entrants are tested. Huge amounts are collected from bank robberies mainly to finance the terrorist activities.

Terrorists in Punjab also have resorted to these tactics. In the greatest bank robbery carried out so far in India, the terrorists looted 5.65 crores of rupees from a Punjab National Bank Branch in the industrial town of Ludhiana on February 12, 1987. Six terrorists in Police uniform led by an "Inspector" entered the bank hall through the side gate around 9.10 A.M. They told the bank guards who accosted them that they had come to check the security arrangement. They made enquiries about the strong room and alarm bells. Meanwhile, others (terrorists) took position in the main business hall. The terrorists, forced the head cashier to open the chest room and strong room. Terrorist did not stop any body entering the bank but no sooner did they enter than they were asked to sit in the corner of the hall with their heads down. The operation lasted for one hour and forty five minutes. Currency notes were collected in gunny bags and carried away in two waiting motor vans.

Expropriation besides being an easy method available to the terrorist is also a means which provides finances for the sustenance of terrorist activity. Although the entire requirements of finances is not fetched through expropriation but it is contributing factors for the funding of terrorist operations and campaigns.

#### **BOMBS AND EXPLOSIVES :**

Bombs are among the oldest weapons of the terrorists. Bombs may be cigar bombs, grenades, gasoline bombs, plastic explosives, wallet bombs, parcel or letter bombs, book bombs, transistor bombs, R.D.X. or radio remote control activated bombs. They can be ingeniously disguised as common everyday objects like hairs-spray cans, Sauces (Liquid Bomb), tennis balls (grenades) suitcases and various types of toys. A bomb may be posted in a letter or a parcel. It may be left in a suitcase, it may be locked in the boot of a car or it may simply be a booby trap. Incendiary bombs, though less lethal are easier to place<sup>20</sup>.

June 23, 1985, will go down as a black day in Indian history for on this day a suspected powerful bomb explosion caused the Crash of Air India Jumbo Jet Kanishka off the Irish coast killing all the 329 passengers and crew on board. August 2, 1984, a bomb blasted at Meenam Bakkam Airport Madras. Killing 29 persons, the blast occurred as two

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20. Karl A. Seger, The Anti Terrorism Hand Book, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 43-44, also see, D.P. Sharma, Op.Cit., pp. 27-28.

items of baggage unclaimed after being checked in for the Colombo flight were seized by customs and were being moved through the international arrival hall. In May 1985 a number of transistor bombs exploded in Delhi and adjoining areas killing as many as 69 innocent people<sup>21</sup>. Bomb blasts in Bombay, on March 12, 1993, the uncertain peace was shattered by a series of deadly explosions of high intensity bombs in the very heart of the metropolis. It was a meticulously planned and ruthlessly carried out multi-pronged terrorists strike which killed more than 300 innocent persons and injured more than 1000 others. Terrorism had come to Bombay literally with a bang. Bombay is the very heart of India's commerce and trade and the targets seemed to have been carefully selected to effect commerce; targets being the Bombay Stock Exchange, Bank of Baroda, Air India Headquarters, Passport Office, etc. In all 12 places were selected over a 20 kms area. The bombs apparently placed in parked vehicles, some with time devices and others remotely controlled, burst with deadly intensity, within a span of two hours<sup>22</sup>.

Bombs and explosive frequently use to tactics of terrorists. This is also an easy and safe method available to the terrorists for carrying out the violence to the adversary.

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21. Karl A. Seger. The Anti Terrorism Hand Book. Op.Cit. pp. 27-28.

22. Maj. Gen. Rajendra Nath, "In the Eye of the Storm", Defence Today, Vol. 1, August 1993, p. 43.

## MASS KILLINGS :

There is a difference between a mass murder and individual assassination. While individual killing is mostly selective, no such restrictions are attached to general killing which will always be at random. Masskilling of innocent people in Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and North East of India, is common phenomenon. In March 1984, the Naga insurgents massacred 300 people in Norhtern Burma for refusing to cooperate with the rebels belonging to the National Socialist council of Nagaland. In two different incidents terrorists killed 70 bus Passenger on 6th and 7th July 1987, in the Patiala district of Punjab and the Hissar district of Haryana. There is no end to the techniques and tactics adopted by terrorists. Some times lettters of threat have served the purpose. This tool has been wickedly and effectively handled by militant in Punjab. Threatening letters have ben issued to judges, T.V. Cameraman, school teachers, politicians and government officials with good results.

These are the few and the frequently employed methods and tactics of terrorism. Terrorism does not follow any particular course of method in stick sence. Infact this is warfare which possess flexibility and creativty within itself. The Tactics are chosen depending on the logistics and the prevailing situations. In other words the resources available to the terrorist farmulate their tactis ; means to



carry out violence to the superior and the stronger enemy with whom they are short of meeting in open combat. This warfare became the consciously chosen way of fighting for those suffering from disparity and inequilibrium in comparison with the enemy against whom the violence is to be carried out.

## **Chapter - 2**

# **The Rise And Growth Of Militancy And Terrorism in India : (Pre-Independence Period)**

It has been a misconception generally believed that India has had an unbroken traditions of non-violence from where a message of non-violence has been delivered for the mankind. Not only the traditions of Buddha, Ashoka and Gandhiji cited that but a legend had been established that India achieved independence by, and only through non-violence methods. When the era of mass politics was introduced in India early this century liberals in politics were pictured that stooges and lacking encourages in the first two decades of the present century. Indian national, because of more militant and aggressive a number of extremist had no philosophical objectives to militancy and use of violence but they became conscious by the fact that the consequences to the use of violence would be forwards.

Even before the movement of 1857, there were instances of armed revolt in several parts of the country. In 1764, there was a revolt in the Bengal army during the period when the British were fighting against Napoleon. there was a mutiny of Sepoys in 1795. Indian soldiers in the Madras army in Vellore revolted in 1806. The Wahabi movement was started in the 18th Century under the leadership of Muhammad Abdul Wahab. In India, the initiative for wahabism was taken by Syed Ahmad Wahabi of Bareilly. The Wahabis preached revolt against the British authority and once they engaged in a small battle near Ambala against the British. Other Wahabi

leaders were Shrivatulla and his son Dudhu Mian. Titu Mian and Sherivatulla organised revolts in Nadia, Faridpur and the twenty four Parganas. The movement of 1857, which was called a sepoy mutiny and which is now considered as the first war of Indian independence, was the most dramatic vindication of armed revolt. Although its leadership was constituted by former princes and feudal agencies and although soldiers fought in it, nevertheless, this movement evoked tremendous patriotic feelings in the population of North India<sup>1</sup>.

In 1894, Damodar Chafekar and his brother Balkrishna Chafekar formed an association named society for the protection of Hindu religion. They were inspired by the example of Shivaji and they were shot to death, on June 22, 1897. Rand, the Poona Plague commissioner. The murder of Rand and Ayerst is regarded as the first example of terrorist violence in Indian politics, although it is the view of some historians that the activities of Vasudeva Balvant Phadke, in 1876, should be regarded as the first instance of political violence<sup>2</sup>.

Shyamji Krishnavarma and establishment of Indian House at London : Shyamaji Krishnavarma a native of Kathiawar in western India, had studied at Cambridge University and qualified for the Bar. After his return to India, he served

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1. V.P. Varma, Modern Indian Political Theory, Lakshmi Narain, Agarwal Educational Publishers, Agra, 1985, p. 328.
  2. Ibid.

in several Indian states but felt thoroughly disgusted with the overbearing attitude of political residents. He decided to work for India's Liberation from British oppression and chose London as the centre of his activities. In 1905 Krishnavarma set up the India Home Rule Society popularly known as the India House; he also published a monthly Journal, 'The Indian Sociologist'. The name 'Sociologist' symbolizes the great influence of Herbert Spencer on Shyamji. This paper bore this inscription on its front page -- "An organisation of freedom of political and social reform". He also instituted six fellowships of Rs. 1,000 each for qualified Indians visiting foreign countries. Very soon the India House became a centre of Indian activities in London. A group of Indian revolutionaries; including V.D. Savarkar, Hardayal and Madan Lal Dhingra became members of the India House<sup>3</sup>.

V.D. Savarkar, a young graduate from Fergusson College Poona availed of Krishnavarma's fellowship offer and left for London in June 1906. Earlier at Nasik, Savarkar had setup an association called 'Mitra Mela' which in 1904 had been merged into the Secret Society called 'Abhinav Bharat' after 'Mazzini's young Italy'. The band of young enthusiasts made India House a centre for pro-India and anti-British propaganda. In May 1900 the India House celebrated the

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3. R.K. Majumdar and A.N. Srivastava, History of Modern India, S.B.D. Publishers & Distributers, New Delhi, 1991, p.235.

golden jubilee of the Indian revolt of 1857 and V.D. Savarkar described it as a war of independence. Savarkar's views were published the following year in his book entitled. The 'Indian war of independence', 1857. Another Pamphlet entitled "Grave Warning" was widely distributed in London and copies sent to India<sup>4</sup>.

Where as B.G. Tilak had believed that it was impossible and impracticable for us to follow the militant Irish methods revolutionaries like Savarkar did not share this believe. They are asserted that it was only by waging a violent revolutionaries was against the British that India could gain independence. Severely asserted that arms revolt terrorism disobedience to law, sadition and all such method an inavailable and desirable for the over through of the British.

The partition of Bengal in 1905, accentuated the revolutionary impulses of many young Indians. They took to the bomb and the pistol and individual acts of terrorism. They lost all faith in constitutional agitation, or even in passive resistance. The British, they felt, must be over thrown by force. The Jugantar expressed their credo in an editorial published on 22 April 1906 after the Barisal conference was broken up by the police, "the remedy lie with

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4. B.L. Grover, A New Look on Modern Indian History. S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1986, p. 406.

the people themselves. The 30 crores of people inhabiting India must raise their 60 crores of hands to stop this curse of oppression. Force must be stopped by force".

But these young terrorists, however, did not try to plan or organise a revolution based on violence and involving the whole country with the masses participating. They preferred to follow in the footsteps of the Irish terrorist and the Russian Nihilists and assassinate individual officials, who either because of their anti Indian attitude or because of their repressive actions, had become unpopular. The India was to strike terror in the hearts of the rulers and thus to arouse the people politically and ultimately to drive the British out of India. By its very nature the planning and organization, the recruitment and training had to be secret underground activities. Many secret societies were setup, especially in Bengal and Maharashtra. Some of them functioned under the guise of physical culture clubs or associations<sup>5</sup>.

In Bengal old Anusilan and Yugantar Samities and a new revolutionary organisation setup in the District of Chittagong under the leadership of Suryasen, signalled the resumption of revolutionary activities. Many revolutionary organizations erupted in almost all important towns of Northern India. Between 1922-24 Yugantar was responsible for

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5. Bipan Chandra, Freedom Struggle. National Book Trust, India, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 95-96.

major terrorist activity in Bengal. This was followed in march by the discovery of a bomb factory in Calcutta<sup>6</sup>.

Mitramela started by the Savarkar brothers in Maharashtra, became the quite well known. When V.D. Savarkar went abroad his elder brother Ganesh started the Abhinava Bharat Society, which soon had many branches all over western India<sup>7</sup>.

The deportation of Ajit Singh (uncle of Bhagat Singh) and Lala Lajpat Rai to Mandalay, in 1907, had prepared the back ground of the terrorist movement. It gave, perhaps, some indirect force to the cult of the bomb. Bhai Parmananda also had a copy of the bomb Manual which was found with the Alipur conspiracy case convicts. Lala Hardayal was another person who provided inspiration to the terrorists. Dinanath, J.N. Chatterjee and Master Amirchand, a teacher of Delhi, were his disciples. Ras Bihari Bose carried forward the work of Lala Hardayal.

Madame Cama addressed the stuttgart international socialist conference in Augsut, 1907. On August 18, she unfurled the first tricolour flag of Indian liberation. Hemachandra Das, a Bengali revolutionary, in Paris, had designed this flag. The top strip of this flag was green with designs of Lotus flowers set in. the middle strip was

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6. Bipan Chandra, India Struggle for Independence. Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 1989, p. 144 see B.L. Grover, Op.Cit., p. 409.

7. B.L.Grover, Op.Cit., p. 406.



orange with the mantra (Slogan) Bande Mataram and the bottom strip was deep red with the sun at the one end the crescent moon at the other. There was no star over the moon.<sup>8</sup>

#### THE MUZAFFARPUR MURDERS AND THE ALIPORE CONSPIRACY CASE :

On 30 April 1908 an attempt was made to murder Mr. Kingford, the Judge of Muzaffarpur (now in Bihar) who earlier as chief Presidency Magistrate had awarded severe punishments to some young men for trivial offences. Prafulla Chaki and Khudiram Bose were charged with the duty of bomb throwing. The Bomb was by mistake thrown on the carriage of Mr. Kennedy, killing two ladies. Prafulla Chaki and Bose were arrested. Chaki shot himself dead while Bose was tried and hanged.

The government searches for illicit arms at Maniktala gardens and elsewhere at Calcutta led to the arrest of 34 persons including the two Ghose brothers, Arbindo and Barindra who were tried in the Alipore conspiracy case during the trial Narendra Gosain, who had turned approver, was shot dead in Jail. In February 1909 the Public Prosecutor was shot dead in Calcutta and on 24 February 1910, a Deputy Superintendent of Police met the same fate while leaving the Calcutta High Court<sup>9</sup>.

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8. G.V. Ketkar, "Madame Cama's Tricolour", Organiser. Vol. XXI. No. 1, August 15, 1967, p. 23.

9. B.L. Grover, Op.Cit., P. 407. see R.K. Majumdar Op.Cit., p. 233.

In Maharashtra Nasik, Bombay and Poona became centres of bomb manufacture. An attempt was made on the viceroy's life. On 21 December 1909 Mr. Jackson, District Magistrate of Nasik, was shot at a farewell party. Even before this, in 1909 Madan Lal Dhingra killed Curzon Wylie, an official of the India office in London as a protest against the inhuman transportations and hanging of young Indians. He was executed "The only lesson", he wrote before death, "required in India is to learn how to die and the only way to teach it is by dying alone".

In Madras province the people were excited by the eloquent speeches of Bipin Chandra Pal. Chidambaram Pillai openly spoke of absolute independence. His arrest led to a serious riot in Tuticorin and Tinnevely in which the police opened fire on a defiant crowd. Ashe, who had ordered the firing at Tinnevely, was assassinated by Vanchi Aiyar of 'the Bharatha Matha Association' unable to escape. Vanchi Aiyar shot himself<sup>10</sup>.

In Rajasthan Arjun Lal Seth, Bharat Kesari Singh and Gopal Singh tried to organise the revolutionaries, even though their activities were not very widespread. Similarly in Banaras Shachinder Sanayal's revolutionary organisation continued to inspire the people to keep the spirit of the revolution alive<sup>11</sup>.

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10. Bipin Chandra, Freedom Struggle, Op.Cit., p. 77.

11. R.K. Majumdar, Op.Cit., p. 235.

**PUNJAB :** In Punjab the revolutionary movement was led by Sardar Ajit Singh, the uncle of great Martyr Sardar Bhapat Singh. He along with his friends organised a society known as 'Anjaman-i-Muhiban-i-Watan', also known as Bharat Mata. The society strongly condemned the repressive policy of the government and encouraged the peasants not to pay revenue to the government. The situation became so tense that the Lt. Governor of Punjab called on the higher authorities to take immediate drastic steps to prevent repetition of the events of 1857. Ajit Singh and other revolutionary leaders were arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment. However, soon after their release, Ajit Singh and Amba Prasad left India to continue revolutionary activities from Europe. In their absence Lala Pindi Das, Lal Chand etc. continued to guide the revolutionary in Punjab<sup>12</sup>.

Rashbehari Bose, then a clerk at Dehradun, became link between Bengal and Punjab. On 23 December 1912, Lord Harding was taken in a procession on the back of an elephant in Delhi. When the people were showering flowers and coconuts on the procession in Chandni Chowk, a bomb exploded which injured the Viceroy and killed his A.D.C. The procession was turned into a funeral. The Bomb was thrown by Rashbehari Bose. There was a lot of confusion and Rashbehari managed to escape. A reward of Rs. 7,500 was amounted for the arrest of

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12. K.S. Sardesi, R. Venkataramanayya, Dr. S. Sen and Dr. G.S. Mansukhani, Unique Quintessence of Modern India, Unique Publications, New Delhi, 1993, p. 273.

Rashbehari Bose. He was chased from place to place but every time he managed to escape. He went away to Japan under a fictitious name. He played an important role in organising the Indian National Army (INA) in Japan. He died in 1945<sup>13</sup>.

#### THE GHADAR MOVEMENT :

Hardayal, an intellectual giant and a fire brand revolutionary from the Punjab was the moving spirit behind the organization of the Ghadar Party, on 1 November 1913 at San Francisco in the USA. He was actively assisted by Ram Chandra and Barkatulla. The party also published a weekly paper the Ghadar (Rebellion) in commemoration of the Mutiny of 1857. The Ghadar in its premier issue asked the questions : What is our name ? Mutiny. What is our work ? Mutiny. Where will Mutiny break out ? In India. The Ghadar party highlighted the point that Indians were not respected in the world abroad because they were not free. Consequent upon complains made by the British representative, the U.S. authorities launched proceedings against Hardayal, compelling him to leave the United States<sup>14</sup>.

With the outbreak of World War I Hardayal and other Indians abroad moved to Germany and setup the Indian independence committee at Berlin. The committee planned to mobilise Indians settlers abroad to make all efforts—send

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13. Ibid.

14. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, S.G. Wasani for Macmillian India Limited, Madras, 1983, pp. 145-146.

voluneteers to India, to incite rebellion among the troops, to send explosives to Indian revolutionaries and even organise an invasion of British India to Liberate the country<sup>15</sup>.

The Komagata Maru case created an explosive situation in Punjab. One Baba Gurdit Singh chartered a Japanese ship Komagata Maru for vancouver and sought to carry 351 Sikhs and 21 Punjabi Muslims to that town. The Canadian authorities refused permission to the ship to land and the ship returned to Budge Budge, Calcutta on 27 September 1914. The inmates of the ship and many Indian believed that the British government had inspired the Canadian authorities. The government of India ordered all the passengers to be carried direct by train to the Punjab. The already explosive situation in the Punjab worsened with a band of fresh malcontents. Large scale political dacoities were committed in the Jallundur Amritsar, Ludhiana districts of Punjab. The Lahore conspiracy trials revealed that Punjab had come 'within a race of widespread bloodshed'.

The virtual failure of the non-cooperation movement and the gloom that descended on the nationalist scene again created conditions calling for bold and terrorist revolutionary activities. The old Anusilan and Yugantar Samities reappeared in Bengal and revolutionary organizations erupted in almost all important towns of Northern India. A

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15. Ibid.

new development was, however, the feeling that better results could be achieved only through an all India organization and better coordination. Hence a meeting of revolutionaries from all parts of India was called at Kanpur in October 1924. The Kanpur meeting was attended by old timers like Sachindranath Sanyal, Jogesh chandra Chatterjee and Ramprasad Bismil and youngsters like Bhagat Singh, Shiv Verma, Sukhdev, Bhagwati Charan Vohra and Chandrashekhar Azad. The deliberations resulted in the setting up of the Hindustan Republican Association (HRA), subsequently (September 1928) reorganised as the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association or Army (H.S.R.A.) with provincial units in Bengal, Bihar, U.P. Delhi, the Punjab and even Madras. Whose basic principle would be adult franchise<sup>16</sup>.

Before armed struggle could be waged, propaganda had to be organised on large scale, men had to be recruited and trained and arms had to be procured. All these required money. The most important 'action' of the HRA was the Kakori Robbery. On 9. August 1925, ten men held up the 8-Down train at Kakori, an obscure village near Lucknow, and looted its official railway cash. The government reaction was quick and hard. It arrested a large number of young men and tried them in the Kakori conspiracy case. Ashfaqulla Khan, Ramprasad Bismil, Roshan Singh and Rajendra Lahiri were hanged. four

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16. B.L. Grover, Op.Cit. p. 409.

others were sent to the Andamons for life and seventeen others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment Chandrashekhar Azad remained at large<sup>17</sup>.

The Kakori case was a major setback to the revolutionaries of northern India, but it was not a fatal blow. Younger men such as Bejoy Kumar Sinha, Shiv Varma and Jaidev Kapur in U.P., Bhagat Singh, Bhagwati Charan Vohra and Sukhdev in Punjab set out to reorganise the HRA under the leadership of Chandrashekhar Azad. Finally, nearly all the major young revolutionaries of northern India met at Ferozshah Kotla ground at Delhi on 9 and 10 September 1928, created a new collective leadership, adopted socialism as their official goal and changed the name of the party to the Hindustan socialist Republican Association (Army) (HSRA)<sup>18</sup>.

On October 20, 1928 the Simon Commission visited Lahore. The Hindustan socialist Republican Party took out a huge procession against the Simon Commission under the leadership of Lala Lajpat Rai. I.P. Saunders gave blows on the head and chest of Lajpat Rai and thereby caused grievous injuries on his person. As a result of those injuries, Lajpat Rai died on 17 November, 1928. The death of this great Punjabi leader, popularly known as **Sher-e-Panjab**, was seen by the romantic youthful leadership of the HSRA as a direct challenge. In order to have revenge, Saunders was

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17. Bipan Chandra, India's Struggle for Independence, Op.Cit., p. 246.

18. Ibid.

murder. Bhagat Singh and Raj Guru managed to escape<sup>19</sup>. On 8 April 1929 two bombs were thrown from the visitor's gallery on the central Assembly Hall in New Delhi by Bhagat Singh and B.K. Dutt. They could have run away but surrendered to the Police. Their trial started on 7 May 1929 and on 12 June, 1929, the sessions judge sentence them to transportation for life.

In the Saunders murder case, the trial started at Lahore. Bhagat Singh was taken from Delhi to Lahore to stand his trial for murder along with Sukhdev, Raj Guru and ten of other revolutionaries. Their fearless and defiant attitude in the courts-every day they entered the court room shouting slogans 'Inquilab-Zindabad', Down Down with imperialism, long live the proletariat and singing songs such as a 'Sarfaroshi Ki Tamanna ab Hamare di mei hai' (our heart is filled with the desire for martyrdom) and **Mera rang de basanti chola** (dye my clothes in saffron colour) (the colour of courage and sacrifice) was reported in newspapers. They won the sympathy of the people all over the country, including those who had complete faith in non violence. The tribunal which tried Bhagat Singh and his companions, gave its decision on 7 October, 1930 and Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev were sentenced to death. They were hanged on 23 March 1931 at Lahore. When the people heard their hanging many persons, all over the country, wept and refused to eat food. attend

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19. Jag Mohan Singh and Chamanlal, Bhagat Singh Our Unke Sathiyon ke Dastavez (The documents of Bhagat Singh and his comrades) New Delhi, 1986, in Hindi, p. 266.



school, or carry on their daily work<sup>20</sup>.

In different parts of the country Chandrashekher Azad, Bhagwati Charan, Yashpal continued their terrorist activities. In December 1929 they made a bid to blast the train of the viceroy near New Delhi. However, Lord Curzon the Viceroy narrowly escaped. These revolutionaries also prepared a plan to secure help from Russia for overthrowing the British government. However, before the Plan could be implemented Chandrashekher Azad killed himself to escape arrest by the British police, when he was encircled in Alfred Park at Allahabad. Yashpal the other revolutionary leader continued to lead the movement for some time before he was arrested by the British and sentenced to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment<sup>21</sup>. However, with the formation of the congress Ministeries in march 1938 he was set free. Even the information of the I.N.A. by Subhash Chandra Bose during the Second World War was a revolutionary activity.

#### **INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY : (INA) :**

The Quite India Movement (QIM) was a struggle fought against the British in India. But equally important is the role of the Indian National Army which waged battles against the British from foreign soil.

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20. Bipan Chandra, India's Struggle For Independence, Op.Cit., pp. 249-50 see BL Grover, Op.Cit., pp. 410-411.

21. R.K. Majumdar, Op.Cit., p. 238.

There were many Indian revolutionaries working abroad for the country's cause. Among these was Rashbehari Bose, living as a fugitive from the British since 1915 in Japan. He seized the opportunity offered by the war to mobilise Indians for an armed struggle against the British. There were a number of Indian soldiers fighting on behalf of the British. The Japanese after defeating the British in South East Asia, took a number of Indian soldiers as prisoners of war. Major Fujiwara a Japanese army officer persuaded captain Mohan Singh -- a POW (Prisoner of War) -- to work in collaboration with the Japanese for India's freedom. In March 1942 a conference of Indians was held in Tokyo, and they formed the Indian Independence League. This was followed by a conference in Bangkok (June 1942) where Rashbihari Bose was elected president of the league and a decision was taken to raise the Indian National Army. Captain Mohan Singh was appointed the commander of the INA which now had about 40,000 Indian soldiers. This conference invited Subhaschandra Bose to lead the movement. Subhas Chandra Bose had escaped from India in 1941 to Berlin. In June, 1943 he came to Tokyo and then joined the INA at Singapore in July. Rashbihari Bose handed over the leadership to Subhas Bose and an **Azad Hind Sarkar** was formed. In November 1943 the Japanese announced their decision to hand over the administration of Andamans and Nicobar Islands to the INA. Thus started the herotic struggle of the INA for India's Independence<sup>22</sup>.

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22. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India. S.G. Wasani for Macmillian India Limited, Madras, 1983, p. 410.

The INA in a few months time had three fighting brigades named after Gandhi, Azad and Nehru. Soon other brigades were raised, namely the Subhas brigade and the Rani Jhansi brigade. The overseas Indians contributed heavily in terms of money and material for the army. The slogans of the INA were 'Jai Hind' and 'Delhi Chalo'. The most famous was Subhas's declaration is that 'Tum Mujhe Khoon Do Mai Tumhe Azadi Dunga' (You give me blood I will give you freedom). Fighting side by side with the Japanese armed forces the INA crossed the Indian frontier on 18th march, 1944. The Tricolour was hoisted on Indian soil. However the INA failed to capture imphal due to two reasons : i) The Japanese failed to supply the necessary material and air cover to the INA. ii) The Monsoon prevented their advance.

In the meantime the British were able to regroup their forces and made counter attacks. The INA fought heroically with tremendous loss of manpower, but the course of war was changing. With the collapse of Germany and set backs to the Japanese armies, the INA too could not stand on its own. Subhas Chandra Bose disappeared. Some believed he died in an air crash, while others refused to believe this.

The INA had failed to achieve its goal but it made a significant impact on the freedom struggle : i) It became clear to the British that they could no longer depend on the loyalty of Indian Soldiers and treat them as mercenaries. ii) The struggles of the INA demonstrated that those who waged an armed struggle against the British were not at all affected

by communal division. There were Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in the INA who had fought as Indians. iii) The actions of the Rani Jhansi Brigadier exclusively women force- demonstrated the capabilities of Indian women waging armed struggle against the British. iv) The INA had also demonstrated enthusiasm and concern of overseas Indians for the freedom of their motherland.

In dealing with the role of Subhaschandra Bose during this period. We have to take note of the fact that what he did was not due to his support to Fascist Germany or expansionist Japan, but for India's freedom. He was determined to maintain the independent existence of INA from the Japanese and while in Berlin he had problems with the Germans regarding the use of Indians legion against USSR. The British Government Court martialled the INA officers and soldiers and put them on trial for conspiring against the king<sup>23</sup>.

It is thus clear that non-violence was accepted as a matter of convenience rather than as a matter of principle. Mrs. Annie Besant had observed that "the day of victory for India (that is when India attained self government and freedom) would be the biggest day of defeat of Gandhi because the spirit of lawlessness, resulting in loss of respect for

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23. Ibid. p. 411.

law, which he was including through civil disobedience would react against the Indian Government and people would disobey authority on the lines taught to them by Gandhi".<sup>24</sup>

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24. Kanji, Dwarkadas, Gandhiji, Through my Diary leaves : 1915-1948, Published by Kanji Dwarkadas, May 1950, pp. 21-22.

## **Chapter - 3**

# **Terrorism in Post-Independence India**

- A) Terrorism in Punjab**
- B) Militancy and Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir**
- C) Terrorism in North East Region**

## **TERRORISM IN POST INDEPENDENCE INDIA**

Since independence Indian History is witness to various kinds of disturbance ranging from autonomous to separatist movements, some of which are still continuing. North East region is the area which has never been peaceful since independence. In these movements, violence was used as a political technique to achieve the purpose for which the violence was justified or carried out. Here it is necessary to analyse few of the violent movements, which the independent India has faced so far. Before analyzing the major movements like Punjabi Separatist Movement, North Eastern Disturbances and Kashmir Problem, it is pertinent here to look at other movements also to understand the dynamics of the movements in which terrorism was chosen as a way of fighting.

The Telengana Peasant Armed Struggle (1946-51) was the first independence trend in the Indian Communist Movement. This movement, organised and led by the communists of the former Hyderabad state, was conducted mostly in defiance of the Indian communist leadership and the International Communist Movement<sup>1</sup>. Initially, this movement was organised around simple agrarian demands but escalated into violent guerrilla action against the repressive measures of the land lords and Nizam's

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1. Mohan Ram, "The Road from Naxalbari" in **Times Weekly**, August, 1973, p. 13.

government. After Hyderabad's accession to the Indian Union the peasant guerrillas continued to fight the Indian police and army<sup>2</sup>.

In 1948, the Communist Party of India adopted the theory of one stage revolution through the general strike insurrection methods. But the Andhra Communist, on Mao lines, defended their strategy for a two stage revolution through a protracted armed struggle of the peasantry based on an agrarian programmes<sup>3</sup>.

By this time dealing with cold war had replaced class struggle in the Soviet Union's foreign policy priorities. The CPI therefore, opted for peaceful constitutionalism formally abandoning the armed struggle. Thus, the Telangana struggle had to withdraw under pressure from the CPI and the International Communist Movement.

The Russians had advised the CPI to follow the Chinese way to achieve independence in India<sup>4</sup>. The CPI and other communist parties, who were willing to adopt the Chinese pattern of revolution, were given some guidelines by Liu Shao Chi, the then Vice-Chairman of China. Similarly he observed that "the trade union conference of Asian and Australian countries held in Peking on Nov., 16, 1949. It is necessary to setup when ever and wherever possible a

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2. Mohan Ram, "Telengana Peasant Armed Struggle", in Economic and Political Weekly, January 9, 1973.

3. Mohan Ram, Times Weekly, August, 13, 1973, p. 13.

4. V. B. Sinha, Red Rebel in India, p. 44.



People's Liberation Army led to the Communist Party, an army which is powerful and skillful in fighting enemies, as well as strong points for the operation of these armies and also to coordinate the mass struggle in the enemy controlled areas with the armed struggle. Moreover, armed struggle is the main forms of struggle in the national liberation struggle in many colonies. In waging armed struggle in the country outside, it should be combined with the legal and illegal struggle of the masses in the towns and districts controlled by the enemy".<sup>5</sup>

The communist from Andhra, Kerala and West Bengal rejected these formulations as "revisionist". They contended that, as Parliamentary democracy was not an effective weapon for socialist revolution, an armed struggle was inevitable. In July 1964, the latter faction met at Tenali and formed the rival Communist Party of India (Marxist), dedicated to the revolutionary goal and tactics. The first disturbance occurred in Naxal Bari on march 2, 1967, the date on which the United Front Government, of which the CPI (M) was the dominant partner took office in West Bengal, owing allegiance to the constitution. Since the CPI(M) was more conscious of the constitutional obligations of the ministry dominated by it to maintain law and order in the state, the government went a head to

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5. Ibid. p. 46.

suppress the revolt. This eroded the credibility of the CPI(M) as a revolutionary party. The lesson for the CPI(M) following and revolutionaries outside it was very clear to build a Maoist party, by splitting the CPI(M) if need be. Thus, the All India Co-Ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) went a head to convert itself into the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) on April 22, 1969. This party was to be based on the principles that: "(i) one of armed revolution, rejecting the parliamentary path; (ii) rural based, to rouse the peasantry to wage guerrilla warfare, unfold agrarian revolution, build rural-base areas, use the countryside to in-circle cities, and finally to capture the cities; (iii) secret and underground, keeping its main cadre underground, and (iv) of a new style, integrating theory with practice".

#### **THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT :**

The term "Naxalite" has its origin in the small-scale peasant revolt in a 256 square miles of rugged area in Naxalbari, Kharibari, Phansideoa in Silliguri sub - division of Darjeeling district in West Bengal, in 1967. This revolt began with the call of the 'Kisan Sabha' of the Silliguri sub-division in March 1967 to (i) establish the authority of peasant committees in all matters of the village. (ii) get organised and be armed to crush the resistance of Jotedars and rural reactionary's and (iii) Smash the Jotedar monopoly of land ownership and

redistribute the land through peasant committee<sup>6</sup>.

As a first step in the implementation of the programme, armed groups of peasants were formed in the villages. This task was to destroy the political, economic and social structure of the village through an agrarian programme to redistribute all the land that was not owned and tilled by peasants; to destroy all legal deeds and documents, with the land lords, scraping of all unequal agreements and mortgage deeds with land lords and money lenders and the confiscation of hoarded grain and work cattle and farm implements belonging to land lords; the public trial and execution of all the land lords known to be oppressors and opponents of the peasant struggle<sup>7</sup>.

"The Naxalite Revolt", as they came to be known, brought to notice the potential of an agrarian revolution of India. They exploited the myth that the Indian peasant was not capable of violence. The first politically led peasant armed revolt took place, as mentioned earlier, in Telangana. For the first time after the 1946-51 Telangana revolt, and before the Naxalbari incident, communists again mobilized the peasants for a protracted armed struggle in Srikakulam, in Andhra.

The next phase in the Naxalite movement was marked by

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6. Akhtar Majeed, "Political Violence of Among and Against the Communist in India", Indian Journals Politics, Vol. XI, No. 2. May - August, 1977, pp. 149-150.
  7. Ibid, p. 150.

the retreat from the rural sense to the urban areas. Calcutta and the neighbouring towns were made main centre of operation. In the beginning, the activities were confined to raiding educational institutions, disfiguring the status of national leaders and organising boycotts of examinations, but the personnel of the CFI(M), policemen and small businessmen. These actions brought immense publicity through the press and radio, which was not obtained by the rural revolt. But this shift in the area of operation also resulted in furthering ideological differences within the party, and more severe and determined action by the government against the Naxalities<sup>8</sup>.

These movements however could not succeed due to various reasons. Rather they were suppressed by the government. But still some part of the country specially Telengana area of state of Hyderabad is conflict prone. Peoples War Group is waging a war in the region. Although this war is not for independence separation but violence with the element of terror is being used to carry out violence.

#### **A - TERRORISM IN PUNJAB :**

Punjab had witnessed a spurt of terrorist activities during the 1980's. Terrorist entered a dangerous phase in 1984-85. Earlier, during 1982-83 scores of innocent people.

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8. Ibid, pp. 150-151.

mostly. Hindus were killed. In later phase Hindus as well as Sikhs including women and children were killed, with the use of the latest sophisticated weapons.

Places of worship were burned by the militants, into arsenals. The accelerated lawlessness ultimately led to military action "Operation Blue Star" which became a sore point with the Sikhs. The assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi was a manifestation of militants anger against what they described as "Oppressive Policies of the Union Government".

The Punjab problem is not a current one although it was started before partition, when Kartar Singh, the then General Secretary of the Akali Dal demanded in 1946, a "Sikh Home Land" for Sikh in Punjab.

After Partition again demand arose for special privilege of Sikhs, because the terror and suffering brought on the Sikhs by partition made the Khalsa more insecure and so more favourably disposed to a separate state. Those who suffered much, the West Punjabi Sikhs were more inclined for separate homeland<sup>9</sup>.

The migration of Sikhs to East Punjab and the Muslims to the West Punjab made the Sikhs a much larger percentage of the total East Punjabi population, one third. Most Sikhs

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9. Bharat Bhushan. "The Origins of the Rebellion in the Punjab", Capital and Class, No. 24, Winter, 1985, London, Conference of Socialists Economists, p. 6.

inhabited a defineable contiguous area in the East Punjab. When Haryana was formed in 1966 the Sikhs constituted 55% of the population, and 62% of the Punjabi population. Then the leaders of the Sikh argued for a separate state on majority status. Since then several demands came out and made the situation more and more complex, that resulted in deteriorating the situation.

The violent crises in Punjab actually started after coming in to the power of Congress(I) in 1980. The terrorists started by murdering Nirankaris, Sikhs and Hindus, opposed to their demands. The shocking murder of Lala Jagat Narain took place on September 9, 1981, periodic murder kept up a climate of violence and terror. A large number of these murders remained untraced.

The murder of Jagat Narain was the beginning of the wave of terrorism that inflamed Punjab, and the failure of Akalis to condemn it was a typical attitude, they more or less, adopted over the killing of innocents subsequently. No Akali leader was at the funeral of Jagat Narain. Local Hindu reaction was hostile, some of the processionists threw stones at Sikhs passing by, raised anti-Sikhs slogans and tried to set fire to the building of Ajit a pro-Akali Punjabi paper<sup>10</sup>.

This was the time when the government could have

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10. Abida Samiuddin, The Punjab Crisis Challenge & Response, Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1985, pp. 48-49.

ripped the mischief in the bud but the state administration, headed by Darbara Singh, showed a none halant attitude: it took the incident lightly, not realizing its gravity. The devide between Hindus and Sikhs was affecting more and more people and it was not a law and order problem alone. The situation in the wake of Jagat Narain's murder began to deteriorate, with the Punjabi Press adding fuel to the fire. The blame for these murders was placed, by the government, on Bhindrawale and Sikh extremist and Press also created the same impression<sup>11</sup>.

Warrants were issued for arrest of Bhindrawale who was in Chandu Kalan. Darbara Singh informed 'Bhajan Lal the Haryana Chief Minister about it and sought his assistance in serving the warrants. But he had already been instructed by Zail Singh on the Phone to allow Bhindrawale to leave.

Bhindrawale was arrested in the murder case of Lala Jagat Narain, but the way he was arrested, interrogated and later on released by the government made him a hero and exposed the unseriousness of the government. Bhinderawale became more bold and issued militant statements indirectly landing these murders. Organisations such as Dal Khalsa, Akhand Kirtani Jatna and National Council of Khalistan became more active. Most of these organisations operated from within the Golden Temple complex. As two confidents of

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11. Ibid.

Bhindrawale were arrested, he came to Golden Temple Amritsar and declared 'Dhram Yudh' Morcha for their release.

Police failure to catch the murderers led to increase in violence. Even factional rivalries and inside Gurdwara Politics led to murder. In this class fell the murder of the President of Delhi Gurdawara Probandhak Committee, Jathendrar Santosh Singh. In December 1982 the terrorists started the killing of their targets in the police force. The climax was reached when on April 25, 1983 Mr. Atwal, DIG, Amritsar was shot dead when he came out of the Golden Temple followed by Criminal in action and the police did not even dare to remove the body of their DIG till they got permission from Temple authorities. Several hours elapsed before a murder FIR was registered. This was the law to which police moral descended due to government's illegal orders<sup>12</sup>.

At this stage in Punjab it was overpowering fear, which made police men apparent accomplices of extremists. If a DIG could be killed with impunity it was child's play to liquidate not only a lower ranking policeman but even his family. Officer's wives fell on the feet of the extremists to get their husband's names remove from the hitlist. A few senior officers like one S.S.P. Amritsar started taking orders from the Golden Temple rather than from the Governor

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12. N.S. Saksena, Terrorism History and Facts in the Third World and in India, Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1985, p. 182.



of the State<sup>13</sup>.

The denigration of security forces was going on systematically and continuously at the hands of government, which later threw hints that these forces were not equal to their task. Only one example will suffice, while Bhindrawale was charged with murder he came to Delhi like a conquering hero, accompanied by his followers with unlicensed weapons and paraded the street of Delhi. There are scores of other examples to show that every police operation or lack of mandatory legal action has a political guideline. The three sacred books of the police, the IPC, Cr.PC. and Police rules became irrelevant. This led to total demoralization of the Punjab Police and it became a contingents of CRPF and BSF had to be brought in to maintain a peace in the state<sup>14</sup>.

#### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS IN PUNJAB :**

Punjab is the richest state in India with the highest per capita income. The Punjab economy recorded a very high rate of growth during the sixties. This growth was so high because of green revolution. The green revolution has resulted in an uneven development not only in different regions of the state but also for the population within a region. The unevenness has resulted in a growing

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13. Satyapal Dang, Genesis of Terrorism, Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, p. 19.

14. Ibid.

popularization in marginal and poor peasants, thus adding to the army of the landless, who had no employment avenues in urban areas. The number of the landless have doubled and those of the marginal peasants has increased three times in the past ten years or so. With capital intensive agriculture workforce rose from 17.3 percent in 1961 to 32 percent in 1971 and the figure is around 40 percent now.<sup>15</sup>.

The inequalities in land distribution have also accentuated considerably while the percentage of small holding is the lowest in Punjab, the percentage of large holding is the highest, the fruits of the green revolution appear to have been grabbed by just 20 percent of Jat landlords who own more than 60 percent of the total land. The fruits of the green revolution appear to have been grabbed by just 20 percent of Jat landlords who own more than 60 percent of the total land. This top group consists mostly of capitalist farmers who employ wage workers. They also have the benefit of institutional credit at cheap rates through their political connection<sup>16</sup>.

This factor facilitated the cause of terrorism in Punjab.

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15. Cf. Harish Puri, "Socio Political Basis of Akali Agitation", Economic and Political Weekly, January 22, 1983.

16. G.S. Bhalla and Y.K. Alag, "Green Revolution and Small Peasants : A Study of income Distribution in Punjab Agriculture", EPW, May 22, 1982, p. 876.

## RELIGIOUS FACTORS :

This factor also led terrorism in Punjab. They claimed separate religion from that of Hindu religion. Article 25 of the constitution has been burnt by them because they were included as Hindu's under Article 25 of the constitution of India.

Religion formed the basis of their separatism. It is the religion which provides them separate ethnic identity. Their identification as Hindu by Indian constitution was not acceptable to them. Religion became so dominant in Punjab that the movement drew its moral strength from it.

The terrorist activities continued to escalate in Punjab. Not only the internal factors were the responsible for escalation of terrorism but external support was also a main cause for providing sustenance to the terrorism in Punjab. In the primary stage arms were supplied mainly by Pakistan but in the later stage, mainly China and U.S. and those Sikhs living abroad provided all kinds of help, ranging from material to moral.<sup>17</sup> Such foreign support of the Punjabi terrorist made it easy for them to carry on terrorist activity not only in Punjab but another parts of the country as well. The terrorist activities paralyzed the civil administration, reducing it to almost ineffective existence. Terrorism where demoralized, both

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17. V.D. Chopra, R.K. Misra and Nirmal Singh (ed.) Agony of Punjab, US Pak Collusion : The Punjab Theatre, Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, p. 125.

psychologically and morally, the civil administration, it also created communal rift, and the distrust among the dominant communities of the state of Punjab, Hindus and Sikhs.

When method employed to check the terrorism failed and terrorist activities continued to escalate, paralyzing the general functioning of the society, making the peaceful existence impossible and discrediting the government as ineffective not able to deal effectively with the terrorist, the government took on strong actions bringing army in the state to meet out the threat posed by the terrorist. The religious places were being used by terrorists as their sanctuaries and base work carrying out the terrorist activities. They took some drastic steps to flush out terrorist from the religious places.

#### **OPERATION BLUE STAR :**

When all methods to check terrorism failed, the centre government took a drastic step to flush out terrorists from the Golden Temple. The military action called "Operation Blue Star".

From October 1983 onwards the extremists started the Golden Temple Complex into a fort and there was large scale storing of arms and ammunition. In this stage of chaos and confusion habitual criminals and smugglers joined the extremists. There are reasons to believe that extravagant hopes were given to them by Pakistan agents and CIA that

once they made a bold declaration of Khalistan and captured power in Punjab, outside forces would come to their help. Meanwhile, silent negotiations were going between the Congress and Akalis only very late in May 1984, the government woke up to the reality that any more delay may be fatal and it was only then that "Operation Blue Star" was launched<sup>18</sup>.

The army moved into Punjab and Chandigarh on June 2, 1984 and undertook the task of putting down the orgy of terror let loose by extremist and terrorist elements and assisting the civil authorities in restoration of peace and normalcy. "Operation Blue Star" took place on June 5, 1984 against the Bhindrawale activities. The army entered the Golden Temple, to purge it of the hundreds of armed terrorists. More than 24 hours battle fought in the premises of this serene shrine left behind a trail of over 500 terrorists killed and 100 injured over 1000 were captured. The army lost about 100 officers and Jawans. Another 100 soldiers were seriously wounded. The militant Sikh leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale was also killed in action. Arms and ammunition in large quantity were found in the Golden Temple<sup>19</sup>.

The swift and phased action taken by the army personnel under the overall command of Lieutenant General

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18. N.S. Saxena, Op.Cit. p. 182.

19. Abida Smiuddin, Op.Cit. p. 156.

K. Sunder Ji and the guidance of lieutenant General R.S. Dayal, Security advisor to the Governor of Punjab in flushing out of the armed terrorists and hardened criminals hide-outs in the Golden Temple Complex.

The "Operation Blue Star" did hurt the Sikh sentiment in the country and abroad. In protest against entry of the army into the Golden Temple, Khushwant Singh, a noted Scholar and Journalist returned the title of Padam Bhushan to the Government. Many other highly placed Sikhs also expressed their resentment by resigning the posts held by them.

However terrorism was not eliminated, murders of Hindu and Sikhs were continued long after the entering to the holy shrine, killing of the innocent and used grenades, rifles, mortars, guns, missiles, and even anti-rocket dumped for sometime past in holy places<sup>20</sup>.

"Operation Blue Star" helped in flushing out terrorists from the Golden Temple, but it accelerated the momentum of terrorism in Punjab. Sikhs Sentiments were badly hurt by Blue Star Operation which continued to reflect in the form increased violence in the Punjab as well as in other parts of India.

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20. Sukhdev Prasad Baranwal, Military Year Book, 1984-85, p.17.

## MILITANT ORGANIZATION IN PUNJAB AND THEIR FOREIGN LINKAGES :

There were several militant organisations for example, National Council of Khalistan Dal Khalsa, Babber Khalsa, Akand Kirtani Jatha, Khalistan Commando Force, All India, Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) and the Bhindrawale Force, which fought for the liberation of Khalistan or Punjab.

Bhindrawale also had his own group centered at the holy place near Bhatinda called Damdam Sahib where he resided. The group has committed a number of terrorist acts.

The National Council of Khalistan was an umbrella organization which was a government in exile in name only. It serve as a coordinating body for distributing information promoting the Khalistani cause. The central organization operated from Khalistan House, situated in well to do Bayswater near Hyde Park in London. It has branches in various parts of the world. Funds for the NCK come from Sikh businessmen in Canada, the USA and the U.K. Money is contributed at meetings in Gurdawaras and by direct contributions. After the army action in Golden Temple (Operation Blue Star) a much broader cross section of the Sikh community were willing to give money to Khalistan organization.

The pro Khalistani groups were sprouted up in various parts of the world where sikhs live. Many Khalistani

organization were based in U.K. including Dr. Chauhan's another famous organisation is the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) founded by a Sardar Jasbir Singh relative of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale after the "Blue Star Operation" in 1984. Another important Centre for Khalistanis was Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada where more than two third of Canadian Sikhs live. Atleast three important Khalistanis were living there. One was Surjan Singh Gill, the publishers of the Indo-Canadian Times and the Newsletter Babber Khalsa, and in the U.S. Ganga Singh Dhillon of Washington who was known to be the close friend of then Pakistani President Ziaul Haq<sup>21</sup>. He also propagated that the Sikhs are a separate nation and maintained contacts with U.S. Senators and persons in the higher ranks of Pakistani administration<sup>22</sup>. There may be some other militant organisations but few were affective and actively operative for carrying out violence in Punjab.

#### **MAJOR INCIDENCE OF TERRORISM IN PUNJAB :**

Although terrorism in Punjab was successfully combated. Terrorist basically employing the methods of extortion, bombing assassination and indiscriminate killing carried out violence in Punjab and the other parts of the country. However thousands of terrorists incidence took place in Punjab, here I would like to mention few of them.

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21. India Today, Nov. 30, 1981, p. 104. Col. 2.

22. White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, Government of India, July 10, 1984, p. 37.



## EXTORTION AND LOOTING :

As terrorism for its survival depends on the economic support and financing, the collection of money by means of extortion and looting becomes the essential part of terrorism. In Punjab this method was increasingly used by the terrorists. Not only looting of banks and other such places but also looting of buses and trains were carried out by the terrorist. Terrorist not only employed this method within the boundaries of Punjab but also at other places, even, Delhi was not spared, banks were also looted there.

On December 6, 1985, in renewed spurt of violent activities, terrorists looted a bus, robbed a bank, snatched a mobbed and set on fire another bus in separate incident, in Punjab. In the first incident four suspected terrorists early this morning looted passengers of a Chandigarh bus of the Punjab Road-ways near Batala. In the second incident, six armed men, for among them stated to be clean shaved storm into a Ludhiana branch of India overseas Bank and looted Rs. 1.5 Lakh at Pistol point. The robbers managed to escape a fiat car after firing at the banks security guard. The guard was injured in the incident<sup>23</sup>.

On February 24, 1986, a government Railway Police post at TranTaran in Amritsar district was raided by alleged terrorists, who took away 16 rifles and nearly 500 live

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23. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 7 1985.

cartridges. The weapons 303 rifles, belonged to a home guards unit attached to the railway police according to report received, four armed men, in Khaki uniform, came in a Jeep to said the GRF post around 2.00 A.M. They gained entry through a window, line up the men on guard duty in a corner with their faces to the wall and escaped with their loot. However, according to the district police chief, Mr.S.S. Virk, the terrorists came dressed in Police uniform. They told the home guard Jawan sleeping in the room that they had come with a message for them. As the Jawan opened the door, the terrorists, armed with stenguns and revolvers, forced their way into the room<sup>24</sup>.

Five suspected armed terrorists looted a rural branch of Punjab and Sindh Bank at Nathuwala Village under the Baghapurana Police Station, in this sub-division shortly after noon on 26th Feb., 1986. District Police Chief told newsmen that the five, who escaped on a waiting blue coloured Jeep, earlier tried to loot the branch of the Central Cooperative Bank in the same village, but changed their plans, probably on seeing a large number of customers<sup>25</sup>.

One of the major incidence of looting which was carried out by terrorist evolved around seventy crores of rupees from one of the bank in Punjab. Besides looting

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24. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February, 25, 1986.

25. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb. 27, 1986.

banks, terrorists also extorted money from industrialist and other rich persons by threatening them to kill if they do not oblige the terrorist and even, sometimes by abducting them. Looting also involved the snatching away the arms and ammunition from the stores and sometimes from the para troopers carrying them. This was the one of the method Punjabi terrorist frequently employed for carrying out violence in Punjab.

#### **BOMBING AND EXPLOSION :**

Bombing and explosion is the method which was frequently and effectively employed by the terrorist. They carried out violence at the extensively by using bombs and explosive. No place particularly public places, bus departs, Railway stations and market places were left untargeted by them. Buses, trains and even aeroplanes were exploded by planting bombs on them. The major air crash which was done by terrorist was the Air India Jumbo Jet Kanishka, air explosion in June 23, 1985, in which all the passengers were killed in the incident<sup>26</sup>.

Another incident was Gurdeep Singh Sehgal, an alleged terrorist who had been absconding since the transistor bomb blasts in Northern India last May was arrested by the operations cell of the Delhi Police on 13th Feb., 1986.

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26. D.P. Sharma, Countering Terrorism, Lancer Books, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 27-28.

Investigation revealed that Sehgal had conspired with Kartar Singh Narang and others to manufacture transistor bombs and then plant them in various parts of the capital. He is alleged to have contributed money regularly to procure the plastic casings and the explosives<sup>27</sup>.

Terrorists also carried out few big explosions at the railway stations and even in the buses, killing thousands of innocent lives, instilling terror among the public, giving the extortion that no place is safe or away from the reaches of terrorists. One of the important thing in this sphere of activity for which the Punjabi terrorist gained popularity was the effective employment of transistor and toy bombs. This methodology adopted by terrorist in Punjab besides in generating fear in the societies also helped in propagating their cause and credibility among the followers of terrorism.

#### **ASSASSINATION :**

Assassination was also used as a means for carrying out violence in Punjab and the other parts of the country as well, by the terrorist. Terrorist assassinated few of the very important personalities of India besides many others who were considered by them as road blocks in their cause.

On August 20, 1985 Harchand Singh Longwal President of the Akali Dal (Longwal Faction), was assassinated by the 27. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb., 25, 1986.

terrorist. Harchand Singh Longwal supported and stooges with those fighting for the separation of Punjab from India. He later on in 1985 signed an agreement with Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India for the resolution of conflict in Punjab. After the signing he took up the cause of supporting the maintenance of peace, law and order in the Punjab. The agreement was not to the satisfaction of the terrorist, so considering Longwal as a betrayer assassinated him<sup>28</sup>. Lala Jagat Narayan a prominent personality of Punjab who was against the policies of Akali and the terrorist was also assassinated<sup>29</sup>. Gen. Vaidya who was entrusted with the task of combating terrorism in Punjab was also later on assassinated in Pune.

A significant assassination which created almost national crisis was of Mrs. Indira Gandhi the then Prime Minister of India. It was a path that she knew well, a daily walk of 10 to 15 seconds at her brisk, no nonsense pace from her home Safdarjung Road to neighbouring Akbar Road for a daily darshan with the Public, or an early morning meeting with a visiting dignitary or an interview with a news man. On October 31, 1984 the darshan had been canceled and Mrs. Gandhi's appointment was with well known actor and writer Peter Ustinov. His crew was to record an interview for Irish T.V.

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28. The Illustrated Weekly of India, September 8-14, 1985, p. 8.

29. Abida Samiuddin., Op.Cit, p. 49.

The drastic assassination of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi on morning October 31, 1984 by their own security guards when she was just about to cross from the Safdarjung Road House to the Akbar Road Bungalow. She died in the one contingency that her legion of security officials, had been unable to guard against : traitors from within her own security guards. That it did points to a deep conspiracy one that could only have been planned by those who had a very good ideas of the P.M.'s movements and security conditions. Sub-Inspector Beant Singh and constable Satwant Singh were probably just cogs in an ominously efficient manner. Beant Singh stationed at the gate, greeted Mrs. Gandhi as usual opened the gate but before she could step forward he whipped out his pistol and shot her from less than three feet away. It was 9.16 a.m. Mrs. Gandhi cried out and slumped to the ground. As if on cue, Satwant Singh instantly sprang from the other side and using his Thompson carbide in rapid fire position, riddled her Prostrate body with 20 rounds. Mrs. Gandhi transitioned from Vibrant life to near death, felled by no fewer than 25 bullets that at such close quarters could not but find their mark with uncarring, lethal accuracy.

The five men who escorted the P.M. and were the only eye witnesses were equally stunned. The Umbrella fell, and they looked on helplessly. The only people who seemed to know exactly what was required of them were the two assailants who immediately dropped their arms and raised

their hands in surrender. Said sub-inspector Beant Singh defiantly as he surrendered. "Hame Jo karna tha Kar Diya, Tumme Jo Karna hai karo", (I have done what I had to do, now you do what you have to do).<sup>30</sup>

The carnage that swept so much of the national capital and part of the country was an unprecedented uniform reaction to the slaying of P.M. Indira Gandhi. For the first time, it was the Delhi region, protected and pampered, that bore the brunt of the anger and the orchestrated, myopic reprisals against the Sikhs. If fortunately, it was less murderous in the states, the worst was in the Hindi speaking northern and central state of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana. The pattern, most vivid and bloody in Delhi was nauseatingly repeated elsewhere : Spontaneous arson and destruction at first taken over by criminally led hoodlums who killed Sikhs, looted or burnt their homes and properties while the police twiddled their thumbs. In desperation and fear, Sikhs vanished from the streets and in traumatic acts of self-preservation, shed their turbans, cut their hair and shaved their beards. The toll around the countries remains uncounted and tens of thousands have been crammed into hastily put together refugee camps and a benumbed country is only just beginning to grasp the magnitude of the violence, it has inflicted

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30. India Today, Nov. 30, 1984. p. 16.

upon itself. Reports have also poured in from all over the Hindus going to the help of Sikhs, of saving neighbours and friends, even strangers from the fury of the Lumpen elements that made up the killers and looters while in northern India, the overwhelming reaction was of mobs turning on innocent, in southern India there was a unique atonement.

The Police in Delhi, Kanpur, etc. was under the impression that anti Sikh riot had approval of the government and a few good police officers, who opened fire to save the Sikhs from being massacred, were under the general apprehension that they might be punished. This impression was removed only after it was broadcast that Rajiv Gandhi had personally toured the affected areas in Delhi and given order that the rioters must be ruthlessly suppressed. This healthy impression disappeared against when Rajiv Gandhi gave a Public Speech in which he said that when a big tree falls there are tremors in the earth. The deaths toll reached 1000 in Delhi, 117 in U.P., 200 in Bihar, 87 in MP, 60 in Haryana and 15 in Maharashtra. A few well motivated police officers did their best but, by and large, the administration did not respond as energetically as they should have done.

#### **TARGET : RAJIV GANDHI :**

His accession to the nation's highest political office came in the tragic wake of the most heinous act of terrorism on the sub continent. Since the Mahatma over



three decades ago, and in a briefing room of U.S. state Department in Washington, it stood revealed that Rajiv Gandhi was to be the victim of a fresh rash of terrorist attack that were intended to rock the foundation of the world's largest democracy. Paving the way, for what the terrorists hoped, would be the creation of the sovereign state of Khalistan. What had saved the day, according to the state department was the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Smashing the plot, largely due to the legwork of one of its under cover agents.

Clearly, the plot as out lined by the FBI director, William Webster, on May 13, revealed that a group of Sikh terrorists had been plotting the assassination of the Haryana Chief Minister Bhajan Lal, who was on a private visit to New Orleans and also Rajiv Gandhi, who is stated to visit the U.S. in early June, 1985 to kick off eagerly awaited festival of India. Apart from these dastardly deeds, the terrorists were attempting to begin, prepare a means for, and take part in military expedition and enterprise against India. Details later showed that their strategy was to detonate high powered explosives at a nuclear facility, bridges and government buildings and also wreck shrines to create anarchy<sup>31</sup>.

Four Sikhs accused of conspiracy to assassinate Prime

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31. Illustrated Weekly, June 2-8, 1985, p. 8.

Minister Rajiv Gandhi during his visit to Britain had planned to here killers from Irish Republican Army (IRA), Prosecutor James England has alleged. Prosecutor said that three of the accused met, what they thought were members of the IRA in a Hotel of Leicester. A Secret tape-recording was made of Marwaha saying that funds were available for the killing from international Sikh Youth Federation of which he was the treasurer.

Three of the accused were denied bail but it was granted to Rai, on condition he produced two sureties of 35,000 each and deposited a similar amount with the court<sup>32</sup>.

#### **FORMATION OF "KHALISTAN" ANNOUNCED :**

On April 28, 1986, All India Sikh Student Federation supported five members, "Panthic Committee" made a formal declaration about the establishment of "Khalistan".

They said this would be in fulfillment of the daily prayer "Rajkarega Khalsa" as conceived by Guru Govind Singh in 1699 and later reaffirmed by the late Jarnel Singh Bhindrewale. The "Panthic Committee" handed over to newsmen a ten page typed statement to this effect. Replying to questions, the member of the committee said that Delhi would be headquarters of Khalistan and their Flag would fly over the Red Fort. They had not yet drawn up the boundaries of

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32. Hidustan Times, New Delhi, Feb. 21, 1985.

the state, but the "Khalistan Cabinet" including the "Prime Minister" and its 'President' would be announced soon.

They said that Khalsa Panth would soon seek formal recognition by all other countries particularly the USA, the U.K. Pakistan China, Canada, West Germany France, Japan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Bangladesh, Israil, Equador, besides other members of the U.N.

"It would seek Recognition from India too" and also strive for economic and military aid from some of the friendly countries.

The "Panthic Committee" meeting warned the opponents of "Khalistan" that their "misdeed" would be overlooked and that they would be properly dealt with. It used the expression "Sudhai Kiti Javegi" meaning that they would not be spared. It directed all Sikhs lodged in jail to remain firm in this goal and said the "Panthic Committee" would do its duty to remove their difficulties<sup>33</sup>.

Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan self styled president of Khalistan is the most well known and vociferous Khalistan protagonist in London, a man who is almost Utopian in his dream of establishing it in India. The man who announce a prize for assassination of late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, it was broadcast, by the British Broadcasting

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33. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 29, 1986.

Corporation (BBC). He started Khalistan movement single handedly in 1968.

Another is Dildar Singh Bains the richest Indian in the U.S.A. it is alleged that he stayed in Rashtrapati Bhawan as a guest of president Zail Singh, when Rajiv Gandhi visited the U.S.A.. Bains flew from San Francisco to Washington to supervise the demonstration outside White House where Ronald Reagan president of USA was formally welcoming the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi.

These Indian terrorists have got citizenship in U.S.A., England, and other Western countries. They collect money and send it to India, arrange training for terrorist and send them to India. They excite the Sikhs creating problem for them as well as for the Indian Government. The Indian government has protested many times in past to keep check and ban illegal activities of these person<sup>34</sup>.

Terrorism as a political technique was employed by the practitioners of terrorism in Punjab. The cause in Punjab besides many others was mainly the independence of Punjab from the state of India. To achieve this objective, they took up the aims and found terrorism as a reasonable way for them to carry the violence against the state of India. The lacking in strength to fight the Indian state in open combat chosen terrorism as a means to carry out violence for political purpose.

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34. Prove India, August, 1985, pp. 8-10.

## B - MILITANCY AND TERRORISM IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR :

It was called by a Mughal emperor as "paradise on earth", the beautiful valley of Kashmir has lately been rocked by bomb blast, shootings and other subversive elements, trained with arms equipments by Pakistan have been causing havoc in that state. There is intense fear among the people. The militants have created tough law and order problem for the state administration. The remoteness of the valley of Kashmir has helped to promote a feeling of special identity not only because it has discouraged the mass influx of new settlers, but also because it has restricted the Kashmir's contact with the outside world. Confinement to a relatively small area for generations has produced an unusual degree of cultural and racial homogeneity<sup>35</sup>.

The militant violence spearheaded by the JKLF men, was first perpetrated from the year 1988, with the exploding of a bomb in the central telegraph office, Srinagar. Next day, on August 1, 1988, another bomb was exploded in the Srinagar club. Again on August 31, 1988, a powerful bomb exploded in an empty bus at Anantnag bus stand killing one person and injuring two who were standing near the bus. This was the third bomb blast in a month. The militants mainly struck on empty vehicles, official buildings and uncrowded places. But gradually it turned to large scale

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35. Kaiyumuddin, Kashmir its Cultural Heritage. Asian Publishing House, Bombay, 1952, pp. 3-4.

destruction, killing, maimings, kidnapping etc. The Kalashnikov culture boomed on all sides in the valley. For this, the then chief minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah, at first accused Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq and others like his estranged brother in law G.M. Shah the "Jana Morcha" of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, MUF etc.<sup>36</sup> But subsequently he was convinced that Pakistan was encouraging subversion in Kashmir.

By the end of 1989 violence had acquired ominous proportions. Dr. Farooq Abdullah in September 1989 stated that one hundred and seventy bomb blasts and one hundred and sixty cases of exchange of fire between the police and militants had taken place in the state<sup>37</sup>. The militants through frequent explosions, killings, kidnapping and bandhs rendered the entire state machinery dispirited and demoralized. The incompetence and inefficiency of the state police was fully exposed. The militants mostly attacked the central government concerns, security forces (Army BSF, CRPF, Police etc.) VIP houses, airport, bridges, roads, transformation, radio station, Door Darshan, Post and Telegraph offices, press, school banks, party offices, cinemas etc. The civilian targets were attacked either to force social reforms or to provoke cross firing.

Dr. Farooq Abdullah's image was tarnished by the use of force against the militants in the valley. He became a

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36. Udayan Sharma, Sunday, Vol. 15, September, 11-17, 1988, p. 44.

37. M.M. Khajooria, "Spawning the Master of Terrorism. in The Kashmir Times, September, 4, 1989.

major target particularly after January 8, 1990 when the security forces shot dead 13 persons and injured over 100 to quell mob violence. Strikes and bandhs were organized to protest against police repression. The militants retaliated and hanged a CRPF Jawan, killed three central Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials. Senior officers of the Kashmir police were also intimidated and their families attacked. Since then the situation has been deteriorating.

On January 19, 1990 a new Governor Mr. Jagmohan was appointed. Jagmohan, it may be recapitulated, during his first term as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (1984-88) had acted against Dr. Farooq Abdullah and replaced his government by a minority regime of G.M. Shah in July 1984. Therefore Dr. Abdullah in reaction to Mr. Jagmohan's new appointment resigned from the Chief Ministership on the same day. The state's administration was thus left to the Governor.

However, contrary to expectations, the new governor failed to combat the growing menace of violence. Instead it became more intense and widespread. Moreover, the excessive use of force had alienated most of the Muslims from his regime. He rejected all hitherto "Soft" and "Permissive" attitude of the state and decided to "Stand firm against the browbeating and bullying tactics"<sup>38</sup>. But this hard-line

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38. Indranil Banerjee, "Flash Point", Sunday, Vol. 17, 4, January 28-3, February, 1990, p. 11

option proved disastrous. People frequently mobbed the streets and his detractors showered on him epithets such as "Hallaqu", "Chengiz Khan", "anti Kashmiri" "anti-muslim" etc. His entire drive against militancy provided grist to the Propaganda mill of the militants and their Pakistani supporters. However, the abuses hurled on Jagmohan were not free from Political considerations. In fact, conditions at the time of his joining had completely deteriorated. Information furnished to the Parliament revealed that the Phenomenon of violence had become serious even prior to the Kidnapping of Dr. Rubiaya Sayeed on December 8, 1989. As many as 1600 violent incidents, including 351 bombs explosions, took place in the state in the year 1989<sup>39</sup>. By August 1989, the militants, with one anonymous call "could order a complete 'bandh' for nearly two weeks. Even a congress minister dared not defy it. The civic staff too saw safety in switching off streetlights on August 15 to observe black day and some high ranking officials absented themselves from the flag hoisting ceremony by the Chief Minister<sup>40</sup>. Between January 1 and January 19, 1990 there were as many as 319 violent acts, 21 armed attacks, 114 bomb blasts, 112 arson and 72 incidents of mob violence.<sup>41</sup>. All this, however, does not mean that Mr. Jagmohan can be absolved of all responsibility.

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39. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, p. 342

40. I.K. Gujral, "Kashmir Challenge of Alienation". The Times of India (New Delhi) October 13, 1989.

41. "Jagmohan's Poser to Rajiv", in The Tribune May 4, 1991.



However, the change of Governor did not bring any qualitative change in the situation. Despite lots of killing and arrests of militants (as many as 700 militants killed and over 5,000 arrested between January 1990 and May 1991) there was no respite from violence. On many occasions, the toll of violence rather escalated.

In Sopore town on January 6, 1993 over 44 persons were killed and property worth crores of rupees destroyed. Over 200 shops and houses were razed to the ground in retaliation. On January 6, 1993 the militants fired and launched a grenade attack on the picket of BSF in Sopore town. Two BSF men were seriously injured (one of them later succumbed to his injuries) and a couple of weapons seized from the picket<sup>42</sup>.

The authorities have also been accused of custodial killings and "Catch and Kill" policy. This created greater sympathy and support for the militants. As a matter of fact, protected use of security forces has been counter productive and has had dangerous consequences. One fall out of this was that the inward looking Kashmiri Muslims, including localized Muslims middle class, which so far favoured the National Conference in the valley, started sympathizing with the militants. Even the frame work of Article 370 seemed inadequate to them. Liberation from

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42. M.L. Kak "Sopore Fire Toll 65: Prove Ordered". in The Tribune. January 8, 1993.

India emerged as the dominant ideology appearing to many Muslims in the valley particularly in the years 1990 and 1991. People's anger against the authorities not only came as a shot in the arm of the militants, but also helped the rulers across the border in intensifying their anti-Indian lobbying by accusing her of holding Kashmir by force.

The Jammu and Kashmir Governor (Retd.) Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao, said; the Pakistan after having failed to grab J and K through open wars, has now waged a proxy war to annex Kashmir. It has been aiding and abetting terrorism by training and arming some of the misguided youth<sup>43</sup>.

He also declared that during the past five years, there have been seized more than 20,000 weapons thousands of grenades, lakhs of ammunition rounds and other assortment of ammunition which were supplied to militants by Pakistan to create large scale violence<sup>44</sup>. And still the incidents of utter lawlessness, such as bomb blasts, arson and destruction of property have become frequent. There are more signs of Panic and nervousness among the people than of return to normalcy.

Along with the increasing fear and deep anxiety, there is intense anti Indian feeling, which is naturally a matter of great concern. For this state of affairs there

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43. The Hindustan Times, December 27, 1994.

44. Ibid.

are two main causes one the endless propaganda by the militants by word of mouth as well as through their own furtively printed propaganda sheets, besides posters on street walls and on poles.

Second cause is the administration's failure to ensure peace and protection to the people. The local people and also the visitors notice the virtual collapse of the administration and the lack of confidence in the ruling elite. The occasional arrest and detentions without trial have caused further resentment.

The situation in Jammu and Kashmir by the end of 1989 developed into an "invisible war". It was not a sudden outburst but the cumulative result of various twists and turns in the state's politics since 1947. However, among the immediate factors which contributed to this crisis were : the toppling of Dr. Farooq Abdullah's government in July 1984; Communalisation of politics particularly under the minority governments of G.M. Shah (1984-86); formation of new combinations of fundamentalist organization is such as the "Muslim United Front " opportunistic alliances and accords between the ruling National Conference and Congress(I) in 1986 and 1987; electoral malpractices during the March 1987 Assembly elections; recurrence of ethno communal violence and regional agitations in different parts of the state; deteriorating conditions in the neighbouring state of Punjab, and resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism

across the border.

The conditions in the state deteriorated to such an extent that by October 1989 People in the valley were virtually seized by an all pervasive dread of militant violence. Any call from the militants for a bandh or "civil curfew" began to be obeyed without any resistance or complaint. Contrary to this, all assurances of safety from the government lost credibility with the people. The disruption as a result of heightened militant activities became so intense and wide-spread that the flourishing tourist industry was brought to a grinding halt in the blood-soaked valley, trade and business were badly affected, schools and colleges were intermittently closed, payment of taxes and tariffs were stopped and people daily fell prey either to militant violence or the cordon and search operations conducted by the Para-Military forces or were caught in the crossfiring between the two. The militants who identified the Indian state and its infrastructure at the local level as their enemy, virtually overpowered the state apparatus and rendered the police and local bureaucracy completely demoralized. Initially, they began by making frenzied religious propaganda, slogan shouting, sticking posters on walls and poles, spreading rumour and by killing some CRPF Jawan, Policemen, IB officials, retired Judges, bureaucrats, managers, politicians etc. Some close relations of policemen were also gunned down and their houses bombed. By January 1990 the state authorities lost

control and failed to prevent the situation from going out of hand. Despite the claims of arrests, killings of militants and seizure of arms, ammunition and explosives by the government there has hardly been any let-up in violence and killing, kidnappings, extortions, destruction of property go on unabated. People are sand witched between gun - totting militants on the one hand and state forces on the others.

The initial estimates that around 300 Kashmiri youths had crossed the border to receive subversive training in the various Pakistan camps were subsequently revised to several thousands. Towards the end of 1990, the then Governor, Mr. G.C. Sexena (Formerly head of Research and Analysis Wing), while speaking to the visiting media personnel said, "the militants have the capability to hit. There are about 2500 or more active militants in the valley and 4000 to 5000 across the border waiting to come in".<sup>45</sup> Further, he said that enormous caches of weapons and explosives, including mines had been captured and these were much larger than the seizures made in Punjab. He illustrated it by saying that in 1989, the Central Government was alarmed at the estimates of intelligence agencies that there may be 500 AK - 47 rifles with the terrorists in Punjab, in Kashmir in 1990 alone, the security forces captured 1300 Klashnikov rifles, 800 pistols, 400 rockets and 40 rocket launchers, 90 machine guns, two tones of explosives and 2,00,000 rounds of

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45. Manoj Joshi, "Another Winter of Revolt", in Frontline, Vol. 7, 20, September 29-October, 12, 1990, p. 17.  
Also See, The Patriot, August 23, 1991.

ammunition.<sup>46</sup> Governor further said that the number of rocket launchers and boosters, explosives, anti-tank, claymore and anti-personnel mines, sophisticated fuse systems and electronic detonation devices, VHF, (Very High Frequency) radio sets, compasses, binoculars, mine detectors and rucksacks was enough even for an army<sup>47</sup>. The other weapons included telescopic rifles (mainly to kill VIPs) recoilless guns to battle and render ineffective army tanks, armoured personnel carriers, mortars etc. The authorities believed that the militant outfits had also acquired shoulder-fired stringer missiles. The Chief of Hizbul Majahideen, Salah-ud-Din, also reiterated that his Jawan were in Position to hit the positions of Indian forces at a distance of seven miles and were well in a position to hit the enemy's war plans<sup>48</sup>. Like wise, a top JKLF leader even boasted that his organization possessed scud missiles in its arsenal<sup>49</sup>. In December 1992, the Governor claimed that the security forces during the previous three years recovered 7,000 Klashnimkov (AK type) rifles, 400 machine guns, 400 rocket launchers, 7000 grenades and 2300 pistols. Besides this he said that about 2100 militants were killed and thousands apprehend or surrendered<sup>50</sup>. However, the total

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46. The Governor's Interview to IFA, in P.N. Jalali "Talks -with Honour Offer to Militants". The Tribune, December, 20, 1990. Also see O.N. Dhar, " J & k needs a Political Initiative". The Hindu, March 15, 1991.

47. Manoj Joshi, Op.cit, p. 16.

48. Daily Submission (Srinagar), December 24, 1992.

49. BPS Malik, "Kashmir the Valley of Darkness". in The Indian Express, August 25, 1991.

50. The Economic Times, December 30, 1992.

seized weapons by the security forces, according to some estimates, might not be more than 15 percent of the arsenal with the militant's in the valley<sup>51</sup>.

Such a huge stock of weapons could not have been brought without the active involvement of the government across the border. In fact, the Pakistani regime which has become victim of "the Policy of Sustained Hostility" has been the major source of supplying weapons, imparting training to militants and framing their strategies and tactics. The Pakistani rulers have not attached any sanctity to the various agreements reached between the two countries from time to time. Most Pakistani leaders, right from Jinnah onwards, have raised a 'hue and cry' over Kashmir with a view to sundering it from India. Some of them have charged India of having Procured the accession by fraud and violence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah once said : "Politically and militarily Kashmir is Pakistan's aorta (Sheh Rug). No independent country or nation can leave its aorta to the sword of the enemy<sup>52</sup>. No sooner did the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede his state to India in October 1947, than Jinnah's government sent the tribal raiders supported by its army into Kashmir. Likewise, President Ayub Khan, who considered Kashmir as indispensable from the point of view of Pakistan's economy,

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51. M.K. Tikku, "Kashmir today-I: Operation Tiger a Success" The Hindustan Times, September, 29, 1992. Also See, Harinder Baweja, "Kashmir : A Fox on both houses", India Today, Vol. XVII, March 1-15, 1992, p. 64

52. Samuel Daid, "Self - Determination for Kashmiries : A Comouflage for Pak's Own Claim" in "Strategic Analysis", June 1990, vol. XIII, No. III, P. 327.

defence and survival, planned the "Operation Gibraltar" and infiltrated Pak guerrillas into the valley in 1965. He maintained that Pakistan's claim to Kashmir was impeccable. This apart, Z.A. Bhutto even bragged to wage a thousand-year war for Kashmir. Not only did he pat the hijacker of the Fokker Friendship plane, Hashim Qureshi in Lahore on January 30, 1971 but his Pakistan People's Party also participated in the victory rally held by JKLF on February 13, 1971 to celebrate the success of the hijacking. His daughter, Benazir Bhutto, in her "hysterical outbursts" on the television and other speeches harped on "free and impartial plebiscite" on the basis of the UN resolution of 1948. Moreover, Mr. Nawaz Sharif had set-up a fund with an initial sum of Rs. 5 crore to help the Kashmiri militants, when he was chief minister of Punjab<sup>53</sup>.

Former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's admission that while in office, he had funded the fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami in a big way for training and arming terrorists for separations in Kashmir has exposed Islamabad's sinister plans to provide material support to militants despite officials denials<sup>54</sup>.

Present Prime Minister Ms. Benazir Bhutto has become more belligerent in her utterances and promised full support to terrorists to end Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. not

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53. The Times of India, March 25, 1990.

54. "Pak Support to Ultras Exposed", The Hindustan Times, August 26, 1994.



only this she has gone one more step by threatening to India to face third war for Kashmir rule<sup>55</sup>. The aiding and abetting of separatist forces in Indian states by Pakistan are the interventionary activities in the internal affairs of India.

Curiously enough, whenever there is domestic or internal unrest in Pakistan, Jingoism on Kashmir and Kashmiri Muslims becomes louder. The Pakistani leadership, right from the very beginning has believed that a "continuous Muslim majority state" should have automatically acceded to their country. It is because of this that they had to indulge thrice in war (in 1947, 1965 and 1971), besides the present day "low cost proxy war" through support to the militants in Kashmir. They have reportedly earmarked funds for it and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other military outfit have been supplying weapons and giving training to the Kashmiri youth.

The ISI, which works under the direct control of military officers organizes finance, training and supply of arms to the militants consignments of subversive literature and cassettes have also been sent to whip up anti-Indian feelings in Kashmir<sup>56</sup>.

Initially, the current strategy regarding Liberation of Kashmir, proposed by the Jamaat-e-Islami of

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55. Ibid.

56. Extracts from Major General Mohindra's Book, "Terrorist Games National Play" in The Tribune, April 5, 1993.

Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) and sponsored by the Pakistani rulers, was formulated in consultation with Maulana Sadduddin, Amir (chief) of the Jammu and Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami; First it was discussed in a meeting between Maulana Abdul Bari, Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami of POK and Maulana Saduddin in 1980 in a village near SriNagar. The second meeting between the two Maulanas was held at the time of Maulana Sadduddin's Haj trip to Saudi Arabia in 1981. The strategy was subsequently chalked out in detail in a high level meeting in Pakistan, which late Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the ex president also attended<sup>57</sup>. The meeting came to the conclusion that an "armed crusade" should be launched by the local Kashmiries themselves. As a result, the first batch of Kashmiri youth was trained in Pakistan with the help of ISI in early 1982, and the second batch was trained in the autumn of the same year. All this began within months of the death of Sheikh Abdullah and the assumption of chief Ministership by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. However, nothing substantial resulted from this strategy, as not many leaders from Kashmir were willing to go along with it. Maulvi Abdul Bari during his Kashmir trip met leaders such as late Maulana Masoodi, Maulvi Mohammad Farooq, Sofi Akbar and Mirza Afzal Beg, but none was prepared to play ball with the Jammat-e-Islami<sup>58</sup>.

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57. Jagmohan "ISI Powerful Terrorist Group", in The Times of India, July 14, 1993.

58. Extracts from Maulana Bari's Article Published in December 1992 in Jehad-e-Kashmir (Fortnightly, Published from Muzaffarabad) in The Tribune, February 8, 1993, also see Times of India, February 22, 1993.

## THE "TOPAC" PLAN :

The process of instigating of local Kashmiri youth was again revived under a new strategy framed by the late President Zia-ul-Haq around mid - 1980. It is believed that the late Gen. Zia had worked out a Plan called "Operation Topac" (named after Topac Amin an Inca Prince, who fought a non-conventional war against spanish rule in the 18th century uruguay<sup>59</sup>. In April 1988 for nurturing local insurgency with the objective of establishing an independent state by liberating the Kashmir valley from Indian domination. The late president did not find much sense in the earlier "ham-handed" military options. He instead decided to exploit India's "internal vulnerabilities"<sup>60</sup>. This new strategy, which was entrusted to the Field Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Pakistan army, palyed. significant role in generating and sustaining the current violence in Kashmir. The major components of this three phased "Topac" plan were as follows<sup>61</sup>.

### PHASE I

- Promote a low level insurgency against the state

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59. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Op.Cit. p. 406.

60. Ibid. p. 406.

61. Maj. Gen. M.L. Popli (Retd.) "Pakistan's Game Plan for Kashmir, Punjab", The Link, Vol.33, May 12, 1991, p. 5. Also see the Text of General Zia's Speech of April 1988, at Islamabad in the Indian Defence Review, July 1989; Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. II May 1990, pp. 181 - 183; D.N. Dhar, "Will Pakistan Repeat 1965 Operation ? The Statesman, Feb., 20, 1990; and Jagmohan, Op.Cit, pp. 408-410.

government, so that it is Under siege, but does not collapse and fall under central rule.

- Place chosen men in all the key positions to subvert the police force, financial institutions, the communication network and other important organizations.
- Whip up anti-India feelings amongst the students & peasants, preferably on some religious issues, in order to enlist active support for rioting and anti-government demonstrations.
- Organize and train subversive elements and armed groups with capabilities, initially to deal with para-military forces located in the valley. In-collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and terror in Jammu and divert attention from the valley at a critical juncture and discredit the regime even in the Hindu mind.
- Establish virtual control in those parts of the Kashmir valley where the Indian Army is not located or deployed. The Southern Kashmir valley may be one such region.

#### **PHASE 2 :**

- Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and Rajouri Poonch sectors to force the Indian Army to remain engaged outside the main Kashmir valley.

- Attack and destroy base depots and headquarters located at Srinagar, Pattan, Kupwara, Baramulla, Bandipur and Chowkiwala by covert action at a given time.
- Some Afghan Mujahideen settled in 'Azad Kashmir', will then infiltrate in selected pocket with a view to extending areas of influence.
- Finally, a special force under selected retired officers belonging to 'Azad Kashmir', with the hard core consisting of Afghans, will be ready to attack and destroy airfields, radio stations, and block the Banihal tunnel and the Kargil leh Highway. At a certain stage of the operations Punjab and adjacent areas of Jammu and Kashmir will be under maximum internal pressure internally by offensive posture.

### PHASE 3 :

Detailed plans for the "Liberations" of Kashmir Valley and establishment of an independent Islamic State in the third phase will follow. In the events of any serious trouble, the Chinese and other friendly power were expected to come to their rescue. At the end of his speech the late president Zia-ul-Haq, said :

"I wish to caution you once more that it will be disastrous to believe that we can take on India in a

straight context. We must therefore, be careful and maintains a low military profile so that the Indians do not find an excuse to pre empt us, by attacking at a time and at a point of their own choosing at least before Phase 1 and 2 of the operation are over. we must pause and assess the course of operations after each phase, as our strategy and plans may require drastic changes in certain circumstances"<sup>62</sup>.

While dismissing the importance of electoral methods to capture power in Kashmir, Gen. Zia stressed "it would be unrealistic to believe that the MUF or any such organization can seize power through democratic means"<sup>63</sup>. He concentrated on the aforesaid scheme and intended to follow it vigorously for the liberation of Kashmir. Emphasis was ostensibly laid on liberation than on merging the state with Pakistan with a view to neutralizing the tendency among some Kashmiri Muslims for Independence.

While on the other side, India argues that both legally and constitutionally J and K is a part of India since the state acceded to the Union of its own free will. The instrument of accession was signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir. Since J and K is an internal part of India, there is no dispute as such over Kashmir. But Pakistan insists

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62. Koshur Samachar, Vol. XXXII, March 3, 1990, pp. 9-10.

63. Ibid.

that Kashmir is a disputed issue and not an integral part of India.

A joint session of the Pakistan parliament adopted on Feb. 10, 1990, a resolution accusing India of repression in Kashmir and calling for a Plebiscite. The five point resolution, moved by foreign Minister Sahabzada Yakub Khan expressed "solidarity with the people of J & K in their struggle for self determination, called upon India to desist from its ruthless attempts to suppress the demand of the Kashmiris for self determination".

It demand a final settlement of the J and K dispute through a fair and impartial plebiscite under the auspices on the UN and in accordance with the resolution of the security council and the directives of the UN commission for India and Pakistan<sup>64</sup>.

Apparently under domestic pressure, Ms. Benazir Bhutto adopted a hawkish posture. She flatly reiterated that Pakistan would not compromise on the right of self-determination of the People of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, the instigations and encouragement by Pakistan there are several internal causes of the trouble in the valley. The state administration has been inefficient, ineffective and also corrupt<sup>65</sup>. According to close observers of the

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64. The Times of India, 12th Feb. 1993.

65. The Downhill slide - "Kashmir Behind the White Curtain". Khemlata Waku on Wakhlu, pp. 340, 345.

turmoil, the present impasses in Kashmir is largely the result of a series of ill conceived policies pursued by the central government and state administration. Political mismanagement and economic neglect are among the principal factors that led discontent and disillusionment. The interests of the people have been repeatedly disregarded with the result that their confidence in the democratic process has shaken.

Since independence, Kashmir's economic development is not satisfactory because its share of national resources is inadequate, so there is no industrial growth. Many important projects, sanctioned, a decade or so ago, either remain on paper or have been abandoned for want of funds.

There has been shortage of drinking water and electricity despite the vast natural water and power resources. Education has spread, but there is inadequacy in employment to the educated youth. Besides, the tourism industry which has earned the country's substantial foreign exchange is still woefully backward. While Amritsar boasts of an international airport, Kashmir has none. These deficiencies, have enabled certain vested interests, both within and outside the country, to exploit the situation.

Besides, economic deficiency, the Islamic factor also has influenced Kashmiris in their quest for a separate identity. The "Shaheed" factor, and the canonization of Maqbool But has been yet another motivating cause for young



militant Kashmiri Muslim.

#### **MILITANT ORGANISATIONS :**

There are over 100 major and minor secessionist groups which have been in existence. Stance wise these can be divided into two broad groups, the protagonists of Kashmiriyat or independent Kashmir and the other who favour merger with Pakistan. The major groups favouring independent Kashmir are Jammu and Kashmir liberation Front (JKLF) which initially grew under the leadership of late Maqbool Butt, Amanullah Khan, Hashim Qureshi, Kabir Sheikh, Abdul Wajid Wani and Yasin Malik. Allah Tigers, Student Liberation Front (now Pro-Pakistan Ikwan-ul-Muslimeen), Al Fateh and Islamic Students League.

The pro-Pakistan Secessionist organisations are Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) supreme commander Sayeed Salauddin, People league Chief Shabir Shah, Jammah-e-Islami Chief Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Jamiat-ul-Tulba Al-Umar-Mujahideen. The Hizbul Mujahideen is the most powerful. The Pakistan Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) have been supplying arms to the militants<sup>66</sup>.

Hizbul Mujahideen has recently split into two groups into the pro and non-Jamat-e-Islami groups under Ashan Dar and Nasrul Islam. The main tussle seems to be for

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66. The Journal of the United Service Institutions of India (USI), Vol. CXXIV, No. 516, New Delhi, April - June 1994, p. 142.

leadership as is apparent by Shams-ul-Haq, chief of Pro-Jamiat faction calling the Amir and for dominance by Jamiat-e-Islami. The major factions from the latest reckoning continue to be JKLF and Students Liberation Front favoring independence and Hizbul Mujahideen and the Peoples League having a Pro Pakistan stance. There is no overall direction or control of anyone from inside or outside, neither are their areas of influence or activity clearly demarcated. JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen are the dominant factions and may be modulating the activities. Separatism is the popular concept common to both, the common meeting ground for a popular stance is secession from India. Along with this vocal agitation against the so-called government repression draws unqualified support from Kashmiri Muslims in all walks of life.

#### **SOME MAJOR INCIDENTS**

##### **HAZRATBAL SHRINE :**

On Friday (Oct., 14, 1994) prayers over the faithful started streaming out when suddenly around 9.15 P.M. the Paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) threw a tight cordon around the shrine. In Shrine an under mind number of devotees, including, women and children along with some armed militants were trapped inside<sup>67</sup>.

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67. The Times of India, Oct. 24, 1993.

The contradictory signals from the main forces handling the seige-the army who have thrown an impenetrable cordon around the Hazratbal Shrine. The state administration headed by the Governor K.V. Krishna Rao which handled the negotiations and the home ministry in New Delhi overseeing the crisis-gave the militants hold up inside the shrine unnecessary leverage. The decision to provide food, restoration of the telephone line in the shrine which promptly used by the militants for Propaganda through interviews with the foreign media, and the conciliatory tone of the negotiations made it clear to the militants that they hold the higher hand <sup>68</sup>.

By the 14th day of the seige, Chief negotiator Wajahat Habibullah, under instructions, from the Government had more or less promised the militants safe passage.

On October 15 Kashmiri IGP A.K. Suri was informed by a member of the Muslim Aqaf Trust G.M. Chisti, that the militants inside the Shrine had tampered with the locks leading to the strong room in which the holy relic is kept. Suri called up Lt. Gen. M.A. Zaki, security adviser to the governor who immediately ordered two BSF companies to surround the mosque and block all exit and entry points before rushing to the governor with news about the "Serious Development".

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68. India Today, Nov. 15, 1993, p. 33.

But just how serious was it at that stage ? It is, for instance, no secret to the local police, the civil administration, the BSF the army and the intelligence agencies that the militants had been using the Hazratbal Mosque as a hide-out for the past eight months. Five major groups JKLF, Al Jihad, Operation Balakote, Al-Umar and Hizbul Mujahideen had been holding arms displays inside the shrine including one just two days before the Siege.

At this hour of crisis, when the decision to lay the seige was taken, the power centres within the Srinagar administration were regularly differing, on ways to handle the Hazratbal imbroglio 'Operation Psycho', meant to wear down the militants by denying them food and water, was handled by the administration while "Operation Flush Out" was the army option.

The day after the siege began when the army took control of the areas around the shrine, it was decided in a meeting chaired by Zaki that the water and electricity supply to the mosque be cut immediately. The army was clear in its objective-to secure the surrender of militants by making life difficult for them. Lt. Gen. Padmanabham declared. He was however, shocked to discover that even on the third day of the siege, neither the electricity nor the water supply to the mosque had been disconnected.

Habibullah again brought up the subject of providing food. His view was that the fight was against the

militants, not the people who were trapped inside. The army strongly opposed the move for the simple reason that it would dilute the very purpose of the siege. The administrations agreed at a high level meeting to allow food to be given to atleast the civilians in the Shrine. Food was taken the next morning, Oct. 21, but the militants, refused to accept it saying they would not take anything that had been given by the government<sup>69</sup>.

Meanwhile around Hazratbal, the tension was mounting as Friday, Oct. 29, approached. The administration, fearing a fresh outbreak of protests, if the locals were denied performing namaz for the second successive week, apart from 15 days of suffering under curfew, had set Friday as the deadline for resolving the crisis. Maulana Abbas Ansari and Prof. Ghani, Hurriyat leaders, went into the shrine on Friday evening to negotiate with the militants for a compromise solution. But by then which ever option was chosen, the Government had already lost the battle for Hazratbal. Lt. Gen. Padmanabham described it as a "no lose situation" for the army. "I do not see any other solution but to stay here and secure the surrdner of these gentlemen", he said, adding that there were some too militants trapped within.

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69. The Times of India, Oct. 26, 1993.

The state additional chief secretary (home) Mr. Mehmoodur-Rahman said that "the government would not capture or kill the militants inside the shrine though the administration could "Just finish the entire drama within 20 minutes."<sup>70</sup>. It was this approach, exemplified by the iron first in the velvet glove, of Mr. Rahman which resulted in the successful resolution of the crisis.

#### **JAMMU REPUBLIC DAY PRADE :**

On 26 Jan 1995, the terrorist holded the shield bound security and blasted two powerful bombs by using remote control. On that occasion J and K Governor Mr. K.V. Krishna Rao was addressing the Republic Day function in which eight person were killed and Governor was escaped unhurt.

A third blast occurred outside the main entrance to the Maulana Azad Stadium. The blasts occurred in quick succession killing a black commando guarding the governor two army Jawans, two police constables and two officials of the state information department. Fifty four persons were injured eight of them critically. The governors advisor B.K. Goswami and some other officials as well as state Janta Dal Chief Dhan Raj Bargotra were injured. Meanwhile the valley observed a complete bondh in response to a call by the All Parties Harriyat Conference (APHC)<sup>71</sup>.

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70. The Times of India, Oct. 27, 1993.

71. The Times of India, Jan 27, 1995.

## CHARAR-E-SHARIF :

The mausoleum of Sheikh Noor Uddin Noorani, better known as Alamdar-e-Kashmir was built in the early 15th century by then ruler of Kashmir Zain ul Abidin of Budshah (Great King) who was among the pall bearers of the revered saint. It was later rebuilt in 19th century during the pathan rule. The Shrine houses the graves of 11 saints apart from that of Sheikh Noor Uddin. In one of the graves rests the body of Lala Reshi, a great grandfather of the poet, Iqbal. The Shrine also housed a number of relics, one of them associated with Fatma, daughter of prophet Mohammad.

Informed sources estimated the number of militants holded up in the shrine to be approximately 70 of these 50 were foreigners mostly Afghan and Pakistani nationals. The militants belonged to three different groups. About 30 (all foreigners and mostly Afghans) belonged to the Harkat ul Ansar, about 20 are from Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir led by Mast Gul and the remaining 20, all Kashmiris belonged to the Hizbul Mujahideen.

Mast Gul, a self styled 'major' who has been extensively interviewed by the local media, is a Pakistani national hailing from the North West Frontier Province who worked as an ISI agent during the Afghan war. Security agencies claim that he had masterminded the assassination of the Mirwaiz of South Kashmir, Qazi Nissar at Anantnag in June last year. This man is an ISI agent. Which country

tolerates a foreign terrorists and agent operating so brazenly on its soil is a point often raised by security officials in the valley. "These foreigners were not just terrorists, they were aggressors", point out a senior army officer on conditions of anonymity<sup>72</sup>.

The historic Charar-e-Sharif shrine in north Kashmir was burnt by Pakistani trained mercenaries as 20 militants and two Armymen were killed in heavy fighting when troops moved into foil the mercenaries bid to escape after the act. Fighting was still raging in the town after troops were given the task of preventing the mercenaries from fleeing. In the fighting six security men had been injured, two of them seriously.

A spokesman of Al-Faateh group, Issa styled himself as a general, claimed 32 militants were killed. He said of those, 10 belonged to his force, seven to Harkat-ul Ansar and five to Hizbul Mujahideen.

The militants on the other hand, alleged that the army had advanced towards the shrine on 12 May night at 2.00 p.m. and fired mortar shells to set it fire and that even helicopters had been used for dropping incendiary materials.

Along with the mausoleum and the hospice, hundreds of private houses in the Gulshanabad locality were also

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72. The Times of India, April 15, 1995.



reported to have been burnt down. Fire fighting operations were hampered by cross fire between the militants and the troops. This is the second incident of fire in the town in three days, the earlier blaze having destroyed at least 800 houses and 200 shops<sup>73</sup>.

The separatist leader Shabir Shah addressed agitated crowds at a number of place along the Srinagar Charan-e-Sharif road. At Wathora a magistrate and a SHO of the Police were injured in stone pelting by the mob. The biggest procession, 20,000 strong, was reported from Chadura.

The strategy employed by the security agencies was to wear out the militants holed inside the shrine and the township located in this district. The hard option of launching a flush out operation in the shrine was completely ruled out<sup>74</sup>.

#### **OPERATION SHANTI : (DODA CASE)**

Coordinated operations against the militants by the army and the Rashtriya Rifles have helped restore normalcy in the troubled Doda District. This welcome change came after a troubled period which witnessed a number of curfews, heavy casualties among security forces, looting and killing

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73. The Times of India, May 12, 1995.

74. Ibid.

of the local population and the subsequent migration of a number of families to neighbouring Himachal Pradesh.

The various operation launched by the army under the code name "Operation Shanti" had also exposed formidable militant outfits like the Harkutul-Ansar and Hizbul Mujahideen which had been dominating the upper hills of the Pir Panjal ranges, when the entire Doda district had been under the operational command of the Border Security Force. The situation deteriorated in the district after the migration of the local population from Gandoth and the subsequent communal riots in Kishtwar and Bhaderwah towns, which left three person dead. Worse, the communal riots created a sharp division among the two communities, who had been living together in harmony for centuries and had remained unaffected by the happenings in the Kashmir valley. Subsequently allegations of looting, extortion and human rights abuses against the BSF were made by the local population and some political and social outfits<sup>75</sup>. Sensing the seriousness of the situation, the centre deputed a team of Senior Home Ministry officials to visit Doda and assess the situation. This resulted in the deployment of additional units of the Army and Rashtriya rifles in the strike torn district. Things soon started changing with the militants, who earlier struck at will finding it difficult to face the "Flushing out and combing operations" launched by the army".

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75. Kalpana Rajaram. Current Events Spectrum. Spectrum India, New Delhi, 1994, p. 29.

"Operation Shanti was launched as part of a three pronged strategy under which militants were cornered from the Anantnag district in the Kashmir Valley, which adjoins Doda and Sarthal in Jammu and from the lower hills of Doda. The militants found themselves in a hopeless situation and were now on the run.

Although the primary purpose of these happenings was not to inculcate terror in the public but to propagandize their cause internationally. What is significant in the armed conflict of Kashmir is that it was not mainly terrorism which was employed that those supporting the cause of independence. Conflict there is quasi - terrorist and quasi guerrilla. In other words it is insurgency in the developing stage terrorism was employed whenever and wherever it was felt to necessary. What is to be said here is that violence in general is used as a political technique for political ends.

## C - TERRORISM IN NORTH EAST REGION

India's North Eastern Region, comprises of the "Seven Sisters" the states of Assam, Nagaland Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. The region has a considerably large international boundary with China in the North Bangladesh in the South, Bhutan and Nepal in the West and Burma in the East.

For decades the people in North East State had experienced political violence, cultural insecurity and economic deprivation, that was sporadic and confined to the Naga and Mizo. But it is the fear of losing their identity as an ethnic group due to demographic imbalance has become the major cause of trouble, that has crossed geographical barriers and engulfed even the perennial peace zone like Meghalaya<sup>76</sup>.

There have been as many as six insurgencies, the well known the Naga revolt which continues at present and it has bases in Bangladesh and Myanmar<sup>77</sup>. The Mizo National Front which captured the main town of Mizo Hills Aizawl in 1966 was another powerful movement. The United Liberation Front of Assam was a third as was the revolt by Tripura Volunteer Force.

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76. U.L.K. Sarin, India's North East in Flames. New Delhi 1980. p. 12.

77. Dangerous Developments, "Sunday Magazine". The Hindustan Times. New Delhi. 21 Aug. 1994.

Most of these movements such as in Mizoram and Tripura have abated or ended as a result of a combination of negotiation and Indian military force<sup>78</sup>. In Manipur, the activities of diverse insurgent groups operating mainly from the Imphal valley for the first time in 1994 came in the grip of ethnic clashes, rise of insurgency and political killings. Over 45000 security forces belonging to different army and para-military units were deployed throughout the state, but two years long Naga-Kuki clashes continued claiming more than 500 lives.

The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is very active in the North Eastern States and giving every assistance including training to insurgent groups there. GOC Eastern Command Lt. Gen. R.N. Batra, said that the ISI had been providing training to the NSCN in Nagaland, to the ULFA in Assam and PLA in Manipur as well as to certain elements in lower Assam in some neighbouring countries<sup>79</sup>.

#### **TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN MANIPUR :**

Manipur is a hill area. However the outburst of terrorism in the valley was mainly due to the follies and short sightedness of the Government of India, which looked at the problem solely from party political interests. In

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78. Ibid.

79. "ISI Training Ultras in North East". The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 18 December, 1994.

early 1980s Manipur, bordering Burma both in the South and in the East, was the most disturbed state in India. After dark Imphal, its capital, looked as deserted city owing to curfew, and in day-times it looked like an occupied territory. The area of North-Burma, adjacent to Nagaland and Manipur, is practically out of control of the Burmese Government and is infested by rebels, aided and abetted by China. There is link between the Chinese, the Burmese rebels and the Peoples Liberation Army in Manipur.

Indian Government itself created a fertile ground for anti national force with practically the largest per capita input of central funds. Manipur's per capita income was only about three fourth of the national average. Out of the state budget of about 80 percent comes from the Centre. The combination of corrupt politicians, corrupt bureaucrats and contractors siphoned out about 70 per cent of the funds sanctioned for development. At 10 percent cut each by a number of persons occasionally starting from the chief Minister himself had been the norm in Manipur.

Even repeated presidential rule had no effect because of continued political motivation of the administration. The scale of corruption in Manipur was unbelievable, every appointment, transfer and posting has a price-tag. Many ministers had a large incomes from smuggling across the Burma border. Manipur was full of smuggled goods ranging from electronics to low cost fabrics.

Out of total population about 60 per cent of the population of Manipur (16 Lakhs in 1985), consisting of Meities of the valley, almost forced their reluctant Maharaja to accede to the Indian Union in 1949. They called themselves Hindus. It is these people whom we have alienated. In the changed political atmosphere the congress(I) chief Minister Rajkumar Dorendra Singh, had the audacity to make a non-sensical statement that Meities were forcibly converted to Hinduism about two and half centuries back. However the slogan "back to Sanamahi" - Meiti faith over 250 years back and recall of the Mongolian past was merely an angry reaction and not the heart felt desire of the people.

There are 29 schedule tribes in this area of which the majority are Nagas and Kukis, forming about 32 per cent of the population. These tribes got the concessions given to them by the constitution and a good number of these got into IAS, IPS and other Central Services. The Meitis were not given army favour with the result their representation in the higher services is very poor.

#### **MEITI TERROR :**

The Meiti terrorism had its roots in 1964 but it started in a mild way in 1978 and become quite bad by 1980. The fear of killings was so great that after dusk the city of Imphal used to turn into a ghost city and no one moved out except the security forces, especially the CRPF and the

Manipur Rifles. There were several aspects of terrorism - looting of banks and killing non-Manipuris and raiding police stations, but their main objective was to kill policemen, especially CRPF. When CRPF captured the PREPAK chief R.K. Tulachandra Singh, with a reward of Rs. 50,000 on his head, he not only escaped from the custody of the local Police but took a constable of Manipur Rifles with him<sup>80</sup>.

When terrorism become fairly bad the Government of India passed the armed forces (Assam and Manipur) special power act of 1958. Section 3 of Act empowers the government to declare any area as 'disturbed area' by a notification. This gives special powers to the armed forces and para-military forces. In August 1979 a number of incidents took place in which a police station was raided and several policemen were killed or injured. On September 22, police station, Moirang, was attacked, five Policemen killed and 16 rifles of the Police Station along with ammunition was stolen. By notification on October 26, 1979 Government declared a number of terrorist bodies as unlawful the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), Red Army (RA), Revolutionary People's Front and People (RPPF), Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) hardly changed the situation. The PLA got an able cadre Bisheswar, who had training in China. The main target of PLA had been in security forces<sup>81</sup>

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80. Iboyaima Laithangbam "Strong Insurgency Under Currents in Manipur" in The Sentinel, Vol. 5, No. 221, 24 Nov., 1987, p. 3.

81. Ibid.



The success of the anti-Indian Propaganda was seen in the anti-Mayang (anti-foreigner) riots on April 28, 1980 when violent mobs burnt down hundreds of huts and scores of motor vehicles and forces many outsiders to flee for their lives. This was another shock to the government because Meitis are by nature quite, peaceful, friendly and hospitable people and such terroristic acts were hardly expected from them. This shows the disgraceful extent to which a corrupt administration had increased the economic misery in Imphal and forced young men to extremes. The situation in Manipur deteriorated fast in 1982 when the insurgents in the hills revived their terrorism. In early March 1984 the terrorists killed over a dozen people, including three children, in Imphal. In February 1982, 22 jawans were killed at Nathilok in Ukhrul district. An abortive attempt was made on the life of the Manipur chief Minister Mr. Rishding Keishing, on December 8, 1983. Keishing escaped unhurt but three Manipur Rifles personnel escorting him, were killed. On February 18, 1985 thirteen Army men and two civilians were killed in an ambush by National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). The assailant, led by T. Muivah opened fire with automatic weapons from both sides of the road, killing all security men in the army convoy. The rebels snatched all the weapons including one light machine gun, 11 rifles and three carbines besides ammunition. These are reasons to believe that USA and China have some plans of creating a separate

country in the North East<sup>82</sup>.

#### **NAGA KUKI CLASH :**

The Naga Kuki Clashes are due to some different reason : one is the political linkage of both the two groups with the political parties, who give direct and indirect support to these groups. Another is the domination of Naga majority over to Kuki minority. Nagas of Manipur want to create a greater Nagaland with the combination of four districts of Manipur which is not acceptable for kukis of Chandel District of Manipur. Another main cause in the collection of illegal money tax by the NSCN with the Kukis are responsible factors of ethnic conflict between the Nagas & Kukis.

As insurgency problems is concerned, Manipur, in the insurgency history of the region faced for the first time in 1994, when armed Naga underground men ambushed and killed 29 security personnel at Yangkhullan area in the states Senapati district bordering Nagaland<sup>83</sup>.

While the National Socialist Council of Nagaland is active in hill districts particularly in Chandel and Ukhrul, the United Nations. Liberation Front (UNLF) the oldest and well organised underground outfit in Manipur has become agile both in the hills and valley in the state.

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82. Ibid.

83. "94 - A Year of Insurgency for Manipur". The Hindustan Times, 6 June 1985.

Other underground organization like People's Liberation Army, Kuki Defence Force, People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, Kuki National Army and other two stepped up their activities<sup>84</sup>.

#### **TERRORISM IN TRIPURA :**

Tripura is the second smallest state in the Indian Union. the Bengali refugees had started coming to Tripura in 1939 after vicious communal riots in Dhaka. They were welcomed with open arms by Maharaja, who gave them forest lands to reclaim and settle down. This state was mainly tribal state but continuous influx of refugees has changed its character so much that in 1985 out of total population of 23 lakhs the tribals would not number more than 6 lakhs. This transformation in the ethnic composition of the population is the root cause of all political agitation leading to terrorism. The massive influx made nonsense of all laws enacted to save tribal lands from falling into the hands of non-tribals. Inquiries showed that about 80 percent of lands in the hands of non-tribals had been obtained by force. This small state has no resources to provide gainful employment to 23 lakhs of people and the massive influx has led to higher prices for land, increase in unemployments and consequent frustration for youth an ideal atmosphere for the growth of Naxalism and terror.

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84. Ibid.

The unhappy tribals soon found a militant organization. which demanded restoration of lands. taken away by non-tribals. These demands first formulated in 1967 when the Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti (TUJS) was formed. Terrorisms was the last painful response of tribal. who got no justice from the congress and not adequate justice from C.P.(M)<sup>85</sup>.

#### DEATH AND DEVASTATION IN EARLY JUNE 1980 :

A wide spread terror, which swept Tripura in the first fortnight of June 1980. left death and devastation all around and Tripura has never been the same since then. The tribal youth did not have enough education and knowledge of world politics to understand. In their emotional response they thought that tribals would again rule Tripura. These innocent feeling of the tribals and the deep anti-non tribals hysteria, whipped up by the TUJS Was taken advantage by anti-Indian elements in India and outside to incite massacres, whose follow is still not over. The anti-Indian inspiration came from Bangladesh. where the guerrilla warfare section of the TUJS went for training and supply of arms.

The TUJS had got hold of the emotional foreigner's issue to keen up the militancy of their youth supporters. To arose hatred against non tribals the TUJS gave a call for

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85. The Sunday Sentinel (Guwahati), Vol. 4, No. 37, 28 December, 1986, p. 1.

bazar boycott for a week from June 1, 1980. The TUJS extremists had started attacking non-tribals. Between May 29 and June 5 at least 12 non-tribals were killed.

The power keg in Tripura was ready for a fuse while the intelligence authorities both in Delhi and Agartala were in blissful ignorance. On June 6, 1980 when there was a quarrel between Bengali Shopkeeper and two Tribals communities were present it soon took the shape of a clash. The fact that violence soon overwhelmed the western and southern parts of Tripura shows pre-planning. Mandari Bazar, only 35 km from Agartala, was the worst affected and here over 300 Bengalis were butchered under a pre-meditated and planned strategy. These massacres continued unchecked for 3 days more and perhaps over a thousand Bengalis were killed. The Bengalis were not unprepared and quite soon they started revenge against the tribals, what happened was not an insurgency; it was not a tribal uprising, it was a terrorism pure and simple first to frighten the Bengalis and then to frighten the tribals. It was the worst failure of law and order till then after independence. Any way in Tripura the main object of the terrorists was achieved, namely, their campaign of hatred succeed and complete polarization was affected between tribals and non-tribals.

#### **TERROR CONTINUES IN 1985-86 :**

The C.P.(M) Chief Minister, Mr. Nripen Chakravarty, is to be given credit for doing justice to the tribals

though it affected the C.P.(M)'s Bengali base. He not only enacted the land Restoration Act but got it implemented against the wishes of the Bengali speaking bureaucracy. The improvements effected recently have not ended terrorism of the TUJS, whose main targets for massacre become C.P.(M) party members. In 1984 union government setup a high level team, under a major general, to evolve a plan for fighting tribal terrorism. This plan visualized a much greater presence of CRPF battalions but it conceded Mr. Nripen Chakravarty's main point that Disturbed Areas Act, giving sweeping powers to the armed forces, need not be applied and that the situation should be controlled by para-military forces. In 1983 there were about 50 clashes between the security forces and the terrorists and about 30 persons were killed. The number of clashes increased in 1984 and about 50 persons were killed. The present threat comes mainly from the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) led by Mr. Bijoy Hirankhal, which has been spreading chaos since he took control of that body in 1982. In early April 1985 there was an ambush at Saikaria in Tripura, which claimed 6 lives of the security forces. The 'hit list' of the terrorists is said to contain about 50 names, the prominent one being the Dy. Chief Minister, Mr. Dasarath Deb, who has given his life to tribal welfare. This proves that the present object of the terrorists is not to help tribals but anti-national forces, getting inspiration from outside India.

On 10th March 1986 armed TNV extremists gunned down

four persons and burnt down several shops at Dataram in the south district of Tripura.

On April 5, 1986 TNV guerrillas shot dead five people and critically wounded 6 at Kurma Bazar. The guerrilla raided the village market and fired indiscriminately from sophisticated weapons<sup>86</sup>.

There is no doubt that in May 1985 there was a sense of insecurity in large parts of Tripura due to terrorism practiced by TNV. According to statistics available to the press for the period 1984-85 (upto April 5) there were 5 cases of ambushing security personnel and 61 other incidents in march 146 and 31 members of security forces were killed. What is worse the terrorists are collecting levies regularly in some areas from government servants, contractors, traders, etc. All this represent a high level of terrorism.<sup>87</sup>

The increased violence by the Tribal National Volunteers is a crude way of impressing upon the centre the need to negotiate with TNV leaders as it has been negotiating with them Mizoram National Front (MNF). Though their means are deplorable their claims seems to be legitimate. There has been a close relationship between the strategy and activities of the TNV and the MNF<sup>88</sup>.

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86. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 6, 1986.

87. Heneray Jacob "So Much For So Little", Sunday (Calcutta), Vol. 15, No. 39, 28 August -3 September 1988, p. 15.

88. Ibid.

The main reasons why the centre is not inclined to negotiate with the TNV is its record of violence. In recent months the TNV men have attacked at several villages they have been playing a game of hide and seek with security forces. After committing gruesome crimes, they take shelter across the border in Bangladesh.

The TNV needs to be tackled in different ways. The violent elements should be sternly dealt with but too much of force on the part of government can prove to be unproductive. A solution to the problem of insurgency is possible only through a negotiated settlement with TNV. A better deal for tribals, however, is the ultimate answer to the unrest in the Border State.

#### **TERRORISM IN MIZORAM :**

In the year 1959 the terrible famine shocked the mizos. It was notorious 'Mautum' - cyclic famine caused by flowering of bamboo leaves. The relief organised by the Government was inefficient and it was then that Laldenga become a leader of Mizos by organising the distribution of food. An ambitious man, Laldenga saw the resentment in eyes of Mizos and converted his famine relief body into the Mizo National Front (MNF) which was the main headache to the government of India. It was a rival source of power because often the people paid more taxes to the MNF than to the government<sup>89</sup>

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89. V.K. Nayan. Threat From Within. Lancer Publishers. New Delhi, 1992, p. 191



Laldenga succeeded in firing the imagination of Mizos with the idea of an independence nation. In 1966 the MNF captured vital points and started terror against non-Mizos. many of them were killed. The ignorance of Government was immense. It was treated as a purely law and order problem. The army moved in a big way, the rebellion was suppressed but the manner in which the army solved the problem left deep fears on the Mizo Psyche. The group village system disrupted the life of the Mizo and increased their hatred for India.

Terrorism reached new heights after 1974 when all non-Mizos were asked to leave Mizoram and a large number were killed. As a result of this terror as many as ten thousands non-Mizos left Mizoram after closing their business. This was a visible demonstration of their power lay in Mizoram. Very soon in January 1975 came the murder of 3 senior Police officers-while they were sitting in their office. Vigorous anti-terrorist measures were always foiled by MNF's request for a cease-fire while Government of India hoped for a peaceful end to the problem. the period was usually by the underground for regrouping and re-arming till there was another bout of terrorism. Thus in March 1980 as many as 25 people were murdered and the situation was so bad that neither the Lt. Governor nor the Chief secretary moved outside their houses<sup>90</sup>.

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90. Ibid.

## BASIC FACTORS FOR OVER FAILURE :

The most distressing factor has been our own ignorance. The Power base in Delhi depends upon the votes of the Hindi speaking states and the politicians had at no time through about a distant and isolated part of India like Mizoram until the rebellion in 1966. The ignorance of the political executive percolated to the senior ranks of the bureaucracy. till 1970 quite a few confused between Nagaland and Mizoram. Even in 1980 Laldenga complained that the tele-communication authorities did not know where Aizawal was. There is no doubt that one good result of constant terrorism in Mizoram is to invite the attention of the Government of India to this region.

In contrast to Indian ignorance Laldenga told Jyoti Jara that when he took the first batch of Mizo boys to China for training the Chinese both men and women who met him spoke Mizo, sang Mizo Songs and gave them Mizo food to eat. This did not prove that the Chinese, as a whole under-stood Mizoram but it did show that the Chinese leadership had trained at least a small band of Mizoram specialists. This brings us to the factor in sustaining terrorism namely Chinese inspirations. After the open Sino - Soviet split in 1969 China renewed its efforts in creating unrest in the North-East in border to weaken India. When Bangladesh became hostile to India after the murder of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman it acted after 19 as a safe sanctuary for Mizo terrorists who received arms, training and moral support.

A sea change has come after the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and the election in Mizoram. Through enormous money resources and by a secret alliance with Laldenga and his MNF the Congress (I) secured a majority and Lalthanahawai became the congress(I) Chief Minister. His inclinations were proved by the fact that one of his first announcement was that he was willing to step down in favour of Laldenga. In the elections the taped speeches of Laldenga were used by Congress(I). It is interesting to watch how terrorism now fares in Mizoram. When the Congress(I) government itself is supported by MNF. The people, after nearly two decades of chaos and terrorism, genuinely want peace.

With the best efforts made by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and MNF leader Laldenga the 10 year old attempt at an accord finally succeeded when both parties realized that they did not have too many bargaining chips and needed each other. under the agreement, he would share power with Congress(I) with him as the chief minister.

But the most important issue that needs to be sorted out is the surrender of rebels and their arms. There have been accords in other places such as Punjab and Assam but the problem remained. There is no guarantee that all the armed insurgents about 500 in Bangladesh and 100 in Burma will surrender along with their arms. The question is whether laldenga enjoys a complete following of under ground

elements to secure the surrender of all rebels. some doubt that he does. Laldenga is now emphatic that he will succeed in his mission.

#### **TERRORISM IN ASSAM :**

Assam is bounded by Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh in the North. Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur in the East. Tripura, Bangladesh and Meghalaya in the South and West Bengal in the West. It provides access to Bhutan and Bangladesh and the state of the North-East which were part of Assam earlier. All these areas are highly prone to infiltration by Bangladeshis and to some extent by the people of Nepal through West Bengal and Bhutan. In addition there has been infiltration of cheap Bihari Labour into Assam like any where else in India.

All these things created security threat for Assam from China, Mynamar and Bangladesh. The threat from Bangladesh directly is nominal, but threat to internal security is mainfild due to the presence of large number of immigrants from that area which is still continuing. It created fear among the real inhabitants for their deprivation. So the real problem of Assam was related to foreign nationals, settled in Assam during the post partition period. So basic demand of the Assamese were that all foreigners must be departed to their country and their names must be removed from the electoral roll. The international borders along Assam must be sealed to check

infiltration.

And Government must issue identity cards to Indian voters in Assam. All Assam Students Union (AASU) and Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) gave agitational shape to these demands by which the whole administration was paralyzed. Their target was to disrupt the movement of oil as well as law and order situation. In view of the serious nature of agitation the central government made efforts to come to some sort of settlement with the agitation leaders. Despite all the efforts no agreement could be arrived on identification and deportation of foreign national in Assam.

The AGP Ministry of Mahanta could not deal with the problems of foreigners effectively. The Centre also found it difficult to detect and disenfranchise thousands of foreigners. The sealing of the Assam-Bangla border was also a difficult task. These factors damaged the credibility of the AGP government and the failure of the Assam Accord created another serious problems of militancy. The two militant organization. the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Assam Bodo Student Union (ABSU) came to existence.

#### **ULFA :**

It was formed in 1979 at Sibsagar by Rajiv Rajkhowa, Parsh Baruah, Pradeep Gogoi, and Gulab Barua for Swadhin Asom (Independent Asom State). The ULFA is essentially an off-shoot of the Assam agitation and many of its member

once belonged to the All Assam Students Union<sup>91</sup> Since 1986 this extremist outfit operating in Assam has indulged in all sorts of terrorists activities viz.. bomb explosions, Kidnapping killings, robbery, extortion at large scale, which ruined the economy of the state and made a mockery of the state. During December 1986 it was reported that the Army arrested two Assamese extremists Prabhat Nath and Pankaj Kumar in Mon District of Nagaland in the extreme North-East, Bordering Burma. Official sources stated that they were on their way to the headquarters of the NSCN in Burma. A letter written by Prayesh Barua, Self-styled "Commander in Chief" of ULFA held it responsible for the killings in Assam during the year. The two arrested ULFA men are reported to have told the army that there were about five hundred Assamese extremists who had already undergone training in guerrilla war fare at the headquarters<sup>92</sup>.

ULFA after lying low for more than one year struck again with its terrorist activities beginning in July 1988. It was reported that during July, 1988, 20 extremists returned after a training stint in guerrilla warfare in Burma. The Police were not left in any doubt about their intentions. Within a week three persons at Duliajan, Namrup and Nalbari were killed by ULFA and the police suspect its activities, involvement in the bomb blasts at Baroeta Road

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91. Radhika Ramesan "Holding the AGP to Ransom, The Sunday (Calcutta) Vol. 15, No. 33, 17-23, July, 1987, p. 52.

92. The Sentinel, 12 December, 1986.

which claimed more than eight lives<sup>93</sup>. With a spate of agitations and bandhs, together with the terrorism unleashed by ULFA, Assam is confronted with uncertainty and insecurity.

The centre government had no other option but to deploy the army for flushing out members of the ULFA. The "Operation Bajrang" launched to flush out the military from the area, but it could not fully establish control in the area. Subsequently elections were held in June 1991 and a new congress(I) Government headed by Hiteswar Saikia assumed office. By then the ULFA had become very active, they killed two hostages-Raju, an ONGC engineer and Bipul Mahanta. The army was again called to assist the state government and "Operation Rhino" was launched, it was also accompanied by a massive public relations drive so that the local population could be won over thereby making things smooth for the army. In December 1991 the ULFA announced for an unconditional and unilateral cease-fire. To tackle insurgency the army carried out Operations Bajrang and 'Rhino', in which a number of divisions were used to break ULFA networks on the ground. An important improvement during Rhino was better intelligence, improved civil military interface and overall command and control, with greater stress on Psychological warfare operations<sup>94</sup>.

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93. Ramesan, No. 72, pp. 52, 53.

94. Lt. Gen. V.K. Sood, "Insurgency in the North East has the Army Delivered. Afsir karim (ed.) Indian Defence Review, Lancer International, New Delhi, Oct. 1992. p. 27.

The other major groups the Assam government has managed to alienate is the state's Bangali (Muslim and Hindu) population. Championing this disgruntled section is the United Minorities Front (UMF) formed by Golan Usmani, before the 1985 Assembly elections. Similarly, in the southern districts of Cachar and Karimganj, the dominant Bengali population is equally incensed with the AGF "Given these Schism, and the fact that majority of the Assamese leadership resents its inability to deport large sections of suspected Bangladeshi infiltrators, instability in Assam politics is inevitable"<sup>95</sup>

#### **ALL BODO STUDENTS UNION :**

The Bodos are the major tribal group in Assam who are demanding a separate state for the Bodos. The Bodos country Starts right from the western Assam and ends at Sadiya in the extreme north eastern Assam. According to Upendra Nath Brahma, President of ABSU, which is in the forefront of the movement for the separate state "If all our land passes into the hands of the non-tribals where would the Bodos go", asks Brahma<sup>96</sup>. The President of the All Assam Tribal Students Union Ranoj Kumar Pegu states " the tribal people of Assam are being compelled to take the agitational path in view of the mounting Government sponsored anti-tribal activities in

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95. Jacob's Report in Banerjee, "The Troubled North East", Sunday (Calcutta), Vol. 12, No. 10, 14-20 February 1988, p. 30.

96. G. Pardesi, "Tribal Unrest in Assam", The Indian Nation (Patna), 20 June 1987 Cited in Why Separate State (All Bodos Students Union Kokrajhar, November 1987), p. 70.



the state". Commenting on the spate of bandh calls given by his organization, he said that these were primarily in protest against the continuing eviction notices in the tribal belts of Assam.<sup>97</sup>

ABSU started its agitation because of socio-economic backwardness, feeling of insecurity due to long oppression and deprivation, non implementation of tribal welfare programme etc.

They launched their movement in March 1987, since then they have been holding rallies, bandhs and indulged in violence arson, bomb blasts, blowing up of road vehicles and railway bridges, vehicles and derailment of trains. In 1988, ABSU renewed the agitation under Upendra Bhrama and demanded a fifty-fifty division of Assam but the state government rejected demand of division of Assam. Violence took the deadly shape in which hundreds of people lost their lives.

Violence was sparked-off by the alleged rape of nine women by the Assam police. In the violence 20 peoples were killed either by Bodo militants or Police and 500 ABSU activists were arrested. The agitation was renewed in March 1989 in which 30 people were killed and 100 injured. The station Master of Sesapani in Kokrajhar was killed and a

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97. The Sentinel. 10 June 1987.

train blowup. In July, the Assam Government decided to conduct all business in Kokrajhar and Nalbari Districts and Udalgiri Subdivisions of Darang District in the Bodo language. The trouble started by the killing of a Non-Bodo by suspected Bodo extremists. 13 villages in Lakhimpur and 33 villages in Sunitpur District were affected, nine people were killed and over 25,000 were rendered homeless<sup>98</sup>.

Violence was continued and in April 1990, Bodo extremists fixed target to blow Police vehicle. They also brought down the Manas Bridge severing Assam's link with the rest of the country. They derailed two passenger trains. In 1 May 1990 the death of Upendra Bhrama, leader of Bodos, was a great setback to Bodos militants. However, they continued their activities. In June they killed the Health Officer in Kokrajhar District, blew up a bus near Barpeta killing 12 and injured 35. During the period March 1988 to April 1990, 300 people including 35 Government servants are alleged to have been killed in the area.

Now, both the government and Bodos militants after blowing hot and cold are in the process of reassessing the situation. Recently on 20 February, 1993 the six year old Bodo ethnic issue was settled, with the signing of an accord on the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous council with legislative powers<sup>99</sup>.

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98. The Sentinel, 10 June 1987.

99. The Times of India, Feb. 21, 1993.

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The north eastern region of India, consisting of 'seven sisters', has long been a conflicting prone area. This region is heterogeneous full of so many complexities, and problems that has caused troubles in the region. Various groups have fought in this region for different political purposes, using violence as a means. Terrorism remained one of the means available to the people of the region. They used it among themselves (one ethnic group against another) and also against the governments as a means for satisfying their political objectives.

In post-independence India violence manifested itself in various forms. Violence as a political technique for political purposes has also been employed by various ethnic and disintegrative forces deliberately, consciously thinking that this could be a vehicle for meeting out their political ends. Terrorism is one of the ways by which various groups carried out violence sometimes against the Indian state, and sometimes against state governments. Terrorism has been chosen as an easy way of fighting which proves costly for the enemy and beneficial for the practitioners of terrorism. It proves costly for the enemy as it creates serious security problems, disrupts the generally accepted norms and standards of decency, necessary for smooth functioning for a society. It attacks the very mechanism through which nation exercises its control over the society. Terrorism whether achieve the political aims are not but the violence perpetrated by it has made us shudder with a creeping sense

of insecurity. In a relatively brief span of time terrorism degrades the quality of life for inhabitant of the nation. The enormous burden on the finance of the nation already over stretched to meet the increasing cost of security causes damaging blow to the welfare and economic advancement of the society. It creates a climate of bitterness and hatred poisons the relations between different ethnic groups by indicating the whole generation into the ethos of violence. Terrorism has been employed by Naxalite, Sikh terrorist various militant groups of North-Eastern region and even by Kashmiri militants. The Post independence history of terrorism in India is that it has been a consciously chosen way of fighting for those who had/have disparity and inequalibrium in military capabilities with the enemy against whom the violence was supposed to be launched.

The terrorist in post independence India carried out violence by means of extortion, looting, bombing, explosion, assassination, Hijacking, abduction, indiscriminate killing and whenever they found any other tactics to be more effective they employed, that terrorism some times was also used in-conjunction with other forms of other warfare like guerrilla and insurgency, particularly in North Eastern Region of India.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

## C O N C L U S I O N S

The world is rocked by terrorism. Governments, politicians and others daily announce plans and strategies but terrorism flourishes and grows. The truth is that there can be no effective cure without sound diagnosis. We must understand and define terrorism and examine from whence it springs. The phenomenon of terrorism can be defined as a strategy whereby violence is used to produce certain effects on an individual or in a group of people so as to attain some political ends. One of the effects of such a strategy is often fear. However, there can be, and usually are other effects.

Both states seeking to maintain power and non-state actors trying to attain power can resort to the strategy of terrorism. In the contemporary world, where terrorist strategies are usually linked to non-state actors, it is often forgotten that the origin of this political term was the state terror of the so-called Reign of Terror in 1793-94 during the French Revolution. In the particular stage of the French Revolution, Robespierre and the Committee on Public Safety executed thousands of members who had opposed the revolution. The term has also been applied in the case of the great terror of Joseph Stalin from 1936 to 1938. A government that resorts to terrorism, the way Robespierre and Stalin did, has one basic purpose : to intimidate those who offer any opposition to their policies.

This concept of terrorism, makes it a method of combat in the struggle between social groups and forces, rather than a struggle between individuals. The victims stand as "representatives of social groups or of systems of government". The publicity value of terrorists is the central point in the strategy of terrorism. The reigning government and the masses of the population are being given notice that "constituted authority is no longer safely entrenched and unchallenged".

Since governments are not inclined to retreat before acts of terror directed at individuals, terrorism has never attained real success as a complete revolutionary tactics.

It must be noted that only the democratic countries provide the liberal atmosphere and the rule of law which, paradoxically, enable the terrorists to survive and operate. Yet, the terrorists, and their supporters scream "foul" when their legal rights are infringed by the authorities.

Same has been the case of India which has been overtaken by terrorism both inside and outside the country. India has been unprepared for such an eventuality with an atmosphere of freedom and relaxation. It is under this context that a Prime Minister of the country, diplomats and even ordinary people have been killed. The country remains in a complete shock and day to day life is full of fear and insecurity.



During the colonial period starting with the British rule in 1858, there were two main types of extremist policies, one was of the nationalist typology and the other ideological or communist typology. The nationalist extremism started earlier almost from the beginning of the present century and ended earlier also with the achievement of independent.

The communists extremism started towards late twenties and continued beyond the colonial rule and is still continuing in the form of sporadic terrorism by Naxalities.

At present, India, is facing around ten well defined terrorist organizations besides the 25 Naxalite groups. Maoist type of urban and rural guerrillas operating practically independent of each other in every province specially Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh Bihar, West Bengal Tripura, and Punjab with roots going into Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and even Srilanka.

In the north eastern India, almost every state can boast of atleast one terrorist setup. In Nagaland and Mizoram, the Naga National Council and the Nation Socialistic Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and Mizo National Front (MNF) have been at the forefront of Terrorism since 1955, 1980 and 1986 respectively. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and Peoples Revolutionary Party (PREPAK), in Manipur, the Tripura Upjati Juba Samity (TUJS) army of Tripura "Liberation Organisation (ATPLO), and the Tripura

National Volunteers (TNV) in Tripura, and the two Khasi and Jaintia Liberation Army (KJLA) and the Public Demands Implementation Convention (PDIC) in Meghalaya, have recently started indulging in terrorism. Some of the other terrorist organization also in Uttra Khand, Jharkhand, Darjeeling, Vidarbha, and other regions have been demonstrating increasing reliance on violence and bloodshed. The terrorism let loose by the fanatic do or die equals of Punjab almost shattered our national fabric. During the "Dharm Yudh" (Holy War) for the 'Punjabi Khalistan, numerous murder, bomb explosions, and train derailment were common. HaryanDeshni, an organization emerged almost overnight in the state of Haryana. And in Jammu and Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), The Kashmir liberation Army (KLP), were doing great loss to men, materials, resources and the nation.

The majority of those individuals involved in the terrorist activities as cadre or leaders were well educated. The leaders of different terrorist, group, in India, such as Babbar Khalsa and All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) of Punjab, Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) of Darjeeling area, the People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh or Naxalite groups, and some of the Kashmiri militants are highly qualified and from different professional institutions.

Indian democracy, since last forty years, has faced many terrorist challenges out of which the Naxalite and

Punjab terrorism has been paramount.

In the history of terrorism in the modern Indian state the kidnapping and release of Ms. Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Indian Home Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, in 1990, was a turning point. The National Front Government's inept handling of the episode with no viable policy in evidence and its eagerness to secure her release at any cost was a clear sign to terrorist groups in Kashmir and other parts of India such as Punjab, Assam and Andhra. Each episode was accompanied by its share of media hype and hysteria. However, the common thread in all these incidents to an informed observer was a far more disconcerting fact i.e. the utter lack of direction and policy within the Government of India while dealing with a hostage situation.

Why this should be so is a pointer to the ad hoc nature of decision making in the Home Ministry of the Government of India, for there is no dearth of studies and experiences available in the world on dealing with hostage taking with some excellent work having been done in USA, Germany and Israel. Even allowing for the unique Indian condition of who the hostage is related to being an input into the situation, the Government appeared to have no answer except constant capitulation. It is time an Indian hostage policy was evolved. To do so it is essential first to look into all aspects related to a hostage situation.

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